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ABSTRACT
High Stakes of Media Messages:
Decoding Visual Narratives from the Iraq War in the U.S. and British Presses
by
Jennifer Liese
Dr. Gregory Borchard, Examination Committee Chair
Graduate Coordinator, Hank Greenspun School of Journalism and Media Studies
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

This research analyzes media coverage of the Iraq War from the perspective of
the invading forces, the United States and the United Kingdom. The New York Times and
The Guardian were chosen to represent news from their respective countries because of
their high circulation rates and international prestige for journalistic reporting. The study
focuses on how the Iraq War was visually represented after the Iraq invasion of 2003,
examining periods in 2006 and 2011. There were significant differences in how The New
York Times and The Guardian visually portrayed the war in 2006, especially in terms of
Iraqi civilian and Coalition military casualties. However, there were no significant
differences in how they represented the war visually in 2011. War is a high-stakes
enterprise and how messages are broadcast visually, verbally, and textually influence the
audience’s perception of the war. With the use of similar and repeated images
encouraging support or opposition to military conflict, these messages become more
salient for the audience.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
In the current information age of minute-by-minute media updates, audiences are
inundated with global and local news coverage, which sometimes confuses their
understanding of important international events, such as war. The information individuals
consume from print, television, and online media play a major part in informing
individual perspectives and constructing societal realities about the world around them.
Many scholars have studied how various media outlets report and portray war on varying
platforms and countries (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Dimitrova & Stromback,
2005; Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Wells, 2007). Recently, much attention has been given to
how the Iraq War was covered visually and textually (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern,
2007; Fahmy & Kim, 2008; King, & Lester, 2005; Wells, 2007).
The Iraq War lasted more than eight years, resulting in the deaths of 4,500
Americans, and cost somewhere between $800 billion and $3 trillion (Ghosh, 2012). Iraqi
casualties have been estimated anywhere from 100,000 to 600,000 people (Ghosh, 2012)
with some estimates as high as a million. With continued war efforts in Afghanistan and
the U.S. involvement in Libya, Syria, and Egypt, awareness of message frames and
critical consumption of media will remain an integral component in keeping the public
informed and conscientious about foreign policy issues.
In constructing news, journalists rely on newsgathering practices and credible
sources to express large concepts, explain the facts, structure the headlines, and write the
storyline (Norris, Kern & Just, 2003). How journalists choose to report and cover events
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are influenced by how similar events have been reported and documented in the past.
Often conventional news frames are reiterated creating “persistent patterns of selection,
emphasis, and exclusion that furnish a coherent interpretation and evaluation of events”
(Norris, Kern & Just, 2003, p. 4). How news is presented — particularly military conflict
— is influenced by complex relationships between political pressures, government-media
negotiations, military censorship, internal media politics, and profit. A number of
scholars have discussed the difficulties of collecting and publishing verifiable and
meaningful stories under wartime conditions (Jamail, 2011; Fuchs, 2011; Schechter,
2011).
Accordingly, scholars and policy analysts have devoted much attention to
studying media messages and their role in reporting the Iraq War, as well as in their
portrayal of the war through visual frames and narratives (Fahmy & Kim, 2008;
Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Wells, 2007). Essentially, during times of war, as
scholars have noted, visuals create persuasive messages that develop public support for
the actions of the government and military (Fahmy & Wanta, 2007, p. 20). How media
outlets reported the Iraq War has been debated and analyzed in several studies (Dimitrova
& Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005; Fahmy & Kim, 2008; King, &
Lester, 2005; Wells, 2007).
Within a democratic society, the importance of reputable, independent and
balanced news sources are paramount in educating the general populace. This is essential
in providing individuals accurate information when evaluating candidates for public
office and in deciding what policy issues to support or oppose — including foreign
conflict. The democratic process cannot exist without members of the Fourth Estate who
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practice independently and critically. In The Press and Foreign Policy, Cohen writes,
“the media may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but is
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (Cohen, 1963, p .13).
Entman (2007) built upon Cohen’s concepts, suggesting scholars need to address the
larger implications of media framing. “If the patterns of slant persist across time, message
dimensions, and media outlets,” he wrote, “it means that the media may be systematically
assisting certain entities to induce their preferred behavior in others” (Entman, 2007, p.
166). This is especially important within the context of media’s portrayal of war.
Two years into the Iraq invasion, Air Force General Erwin Lessel addressed the
importance of aligning public opinion with the government’s position for policy makers.
General Lessel explained the government focuses on public perceptions and public
information within the United States. “That support, that information, is necessary,” he
wrote. ”You can’t fight a war; you can’t go forth successfully, without popular U.S.
support” (McCormick Tribune, 2005, p. 109). However, in order to maintain a selfgoverning democracy, it is imperative that the populace is educated. James Madison
made this point early in the nation’s formation when he wrote, “A popular Government,
without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or
a Tragedy; or, perhaps both” (Madison, 1822, p. 103). Geoffrey Stone, professor of law at
the University of Chicago, reiterates Madison’s sentiment in his explanation for the
necessity and importance of the First Amendment and the difficulties of its application in
wartime. “In a self-governing democracy, it is fundamental that citizens openly discuss
policy and debate freely who their leaders should be,” Stone wrote. “And there is no issue
more important than whether and how to go to war” (McCormick Tribune, 2005, p. 14).
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Media messages supporting or opposing the Iraq War have varied significantly
between media platforms and countries, with a number of these studies focusing on
pictorial representations of key events (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & ConnollyAhern, 2007; Wells, 2007). War is a “high-stakes enterprise” and every war includes
competing images and messages to influence public perceptions (Griffin, 2010). While
previous studies have completed comparative analyses of news images during the Iraq
invasion in 2003, this thesis includes images and messages from the occupation, and the
official end of the Iraq War in 2011. A comprehensive analysis of news from the United
States and the United Kingdom during this period provides a better understanding of the
complex relationships between government, public interest, and the press.

Background
The ability of photographs to capture and bear witness to moments in time have
captivated audiences and influenced history. Images published or broadcast with news
stories play a major role in affecting media frames and messages (Sontag, 2003; Fahmy
& Kim, 2008; Wells, 2007). Since photography’s inception, the new medium was
heralded “the ultimate eyewitness, unhampered by subjectivity, memory lapses, or flights
of fancy” (Goldberg, 1991, p. 19). Today, when audiences are aware of the ability to
manipulate images, sophisticated observers often tend to believe unconsciously the
camera’s report (Goldberg, 1991).
The “juxtaposition and integration” of other images and text can further alter
visual meanings (Roskill & Carrier, 1983, p. 19). Therefore, awareness of image
manipulation and the marketing of messages will help audiences be less susceptible to
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coercive visual frames (Messaris, 1994). Sontag (2003) addressed this phenomenon in
her analysis of how photographs are not simply transparencies of what happened. They
are “the image that someone chose; to photograph is to frame, and to frame is to exclude”
(Sontag, 2003, p. 46). War photography initially was intended to “drum up support” for
soldiers and their sacrifices (Sontag, 2003, p. 48). The manipulation of photographs and
war staging goes back to Civil War photography. Common at the time of Mathew
Brady’s Civil War photography was the staging of dead bodies for dramatic effect
(Borchard, Mullen & Bates, 2013). “To photograph was to compose (with living subjects,
to pose), and the desire to arrange elements in the picture did not vanish because the
subject was immobilized, or immobile” (Sontag, 2003, p. 53).
Scholars continue to cite Entman’s (1993) definition of framing (Fahmy & Kim,
2008; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007). Entman (1993) was particularly interested in
how framing influences the perceptions and thoughts of audiences (p. 51). To frame, he
wrote, “is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a
communicating text” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Frames “define problems,” “diagnose
causes,” “make moral judgments,” and “suggest remedies” (Entman, 1993, p. 52).
Frames call attention to some aspects of reality, but they also obscure others (Entman,
1993, p. 55). Framing plays a significant role in the exertion of power, and “the frame in
a news text is really the imprint of power — it registers the identity of actors or interests
that competed to dominate the text” (Entman, 1993, p. 55).
However, discussing and applying the terms of frames and framing to visual
images can be problematic. In photography, framing can mean how the subject is
contained within the physical borders of the image, the choice of subject, and the
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intention to represent meaning through the image. In communication studies, the concept
of framing can refer to text, images, and rhetoric and it refers to how messages are
articulated and received (Entman, 1993). Clearly defining concepts and terms utilized
within academic literature is necessary in communicating complex and multifaceted
topics.
This study will provide a necessary contribution to the scholarship that has not
previously addressed the roles of major newspapers in communicating international
events. The New York Times and The Guardian are among the world’s most respected
newspapers (Fahmy & Kim, 2008). The Sunday edition of The New York Times ranks
first in the nation for the largest circulation rates, and the daily newspaper holds the
second-largest circulation rates (Haughney, 2013). The Guardian’s print and online
versions have been utilized by previous researchers studying media coverage of the Iraq
war from the United Kingdom (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern,
2007; Wells, 2007). Similarly, previous researchers have also used The New York Times
to analyze and represent media coverage of the Iraq war from the United States (Fahmy
& Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007). Moreover, both The Times and The
Guardian have secured their places in research as among the most cited newspaper
sources for conducting analyses on international media events.

Thematic Statement
Scholars have documented how photographs that illustrate messages and frame
news have influenced audiences. War images have the ability to persuade, provoke,
inspire, influence, compel change, and reinforce nationalistic causes. This thesis provides
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a comparative analysis of war frames over the course of a conflict, from invasion to
official end. To analyze contemporary war reporting, the thesis examines the recent
conflict between American forces and the counterinsurgency in Iraq. The thesis analyzes
the newspapers of the invading forces, namely The New York Times and The Guardian,
two newspapers chosen for their journalistic quality and international prestige. Both
papers are politically independent, but considered left leaning in political stance and
journalistic viewpoints. The Times is among the few family owned and operated major
newspapers still publishing in the United States. The Guardian Media Group, a trust that
exists in part to secure the financial and editorial independence of The Guardian, owns
the newspaper, which was founded by textile traders and merchants as “an organ of the
middle class” (Engels, 1973, p. 109). Given their statuses as independent newspapers,
both with important perspectives on international issues, previous scholars have utilized
The New York Times and The Guardian to represent journalistic reporting from the
United States and the United Kingdom (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & ConnollyAhern, 2007; Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005). “Both of these prestigious newspapers fall
into the same liberal model … as they tend to hold more liberal viewpoints in comparison
with other newspapers in their country” (Fahmy & Kim, 2008, p. 448).
The United States and the United Kingdom are both major powers in the
international world and had similar stakes in the Iraq War, and previous studies have
found many similarities and some differences between their published war images
(Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007). For this thesis, a content
analysis of published Iraq War images from The New York Times and The Guardian was
developed through the examination of images, headlines, and photographic captions. This
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thesis compares the same historic events in both publications, which include the
occupation period in 2006, and the close of the war in 2011. Additionally, the thesis
investigates how the British press and the American press relayed these events in their
photographic news coverage. The research examines ongoing or changing war
frames/narratives within each publication, as well as how The New York Times and The
Guardian’s coverage compared to each other. In providing a longitudinal study of the
Iraq War, this research analyzes complex issues including the purpose of the war, the
success/status of the war, and the impact/future implications of the war as relayed
through the lens of media.

Significance of the Study
The ways in which messages are broadcast visually, verbally, and textually
influence the audience’s perception of events. With the use of similar and repeated
images juxtaposed with text, these messages become more salient for the audience. Much
attention has been given to media messages and their role in supporting or opposing the
Iraq War through frames and narratives, which has varied significantly between media
platforms and countries (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern, 2007;
Wells, 2007). After all, foreign policy news is closely related to security issues; therefore,
international events are often framed in a matter that is consistent to the host country’s
government interests.
While previous studies have provided comparative analyses of news images
during the Iraq invasion in 2003, this thesis contributes to scholarly research by including
images and messages from the occupation, and the official end of the Iraq War in 2011.
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The daily newspapers of the U.S.’s The New York Times and the U.K.’s The Guardian
were analyzed for this study. Daily newspapers rather than weekly magazines were
chosen for this research in order to get an immediate interpretation of events, one that is
more commonly used by consumers of news, as well as media outlets, including websites
and broadcasters. By examining disparate media coverage of war, this thesis develops
new scholarship on framing analysis.

Literature Review
Several scholars have examined the visual coverage of military conflicts in the
Middle East over the last twenty-two years. A few different types of studies have
emerged. Some scholars have provided a historical analysis of war reporting within a
country (King & Lester, 2005; Griffin, 1995, 2004). Other researchers have focused on
war reporting within a single country during an event or short duration of time (Keith,
Schwalbe, & Silcock, 2009; Wells, 2007). Finally, other studies have compared the
reporting of military conflict between countries (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova &
Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005). Within all these studies, several
techniques of visual and textual analysis have been conducted, highlighting varying
degrees of success and shortcomings.
King and Lester (2005) conducted a historical content analysis of photographic
images from the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War. The authors compared
the differences in the visual coverage from the media pool system used in 1991 to the use
of embedded journalists in 2003. Journalists chosen to make up the military press pool
was highly selective at about 100 individuals, with a pool of sixteen reporters covering

9	
  

every ground unit of over 500,000 troops (King & Lester, 2005). Also, in 1991 all stories
and images required military approval and were subject to censorship (King & Lester,
2005). During the 2003 Iraq War, more than 500 embedded journalists were trained by
military officials and traveled with coalition combat units (King & Lester, 2005). While
the embedded journalists in 2003 were subject to less restrictive practices than the 1991
reporters, many argued because the embedded reporters are so dependent on the soldiers
for safety—they would be more likely to identify with them and report stories that are
more favorable about the soldiers and the war (King & Lester, 2005).
The first week of the start of the ground war in 1991 and 2003 were compared on
microfilm for the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, and the New York Times
(King & Lester, 2005). From the two periods, 1,023 photographs were analyzed, 317 for
1991 and 706 for 2003 (King & Lester, 2005). There were statistically significant
differences in content categories between 1991 and 2003. The 2003 conflict contained
more fighting scenes, and protestor images. The 1991 war had a larger proportion of
battlefield scenes, prisoners, and civilian images and portraits. The ratio of images for
deceased soldiers, injured soldiers, and miscellaneous pictures for both wars was similar.
Significant differences were also found on page selection, the 1991 war had almost twice
as many front-page images than the 2003 conflict. The authors found the combined
categories of battle scenes similar for both wars. The authors concluded the embedding
program resulted in a much larger frequency of published war images in 2003 over 1991;
however, allowing journalists better access to war zones “may not automatically result in
more direct war coverage” (King & Lester, 2005).
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Griffin (2004) analyzed the U.S. news-magazine photo coverage of the “War on
Terrorism” in Afghanistan and the Iraq invasion (p. 381). Griffin utilized the same
photographic methods of classifying images into frames as his earlier study of the 1991
Persian Gulf War. In the earlier study of the Gulf War, Griffin and Lee (1995) found little
attention was given to actual combat, civilian casualties, or cultural damage. Instead, 57
percent of all pictures published in news magazines consisted of images of the American
arsenal (planes, ships, tanks, missiles, and other weapons), troops (not in combat), and
pictures of political and military leaders (Griffin & Lee, 1995). The central theme of the
pictorial representation promoted the power and superiority of the American military,
while neglecting the human cost or cultural contexts of the conflict (Griffin & Lee, 1995).
Then in Griffin’s (2004) study, images of the 2003 invasion of Iraq were found to
be similar to the (1995) study of the Persian Gulf War. About half of all photographs
printed in U.S. news magazines were of the arsenal, unengaged troops, and political
leaders (Griffin, 2004). Also, as a result of embedded journalists with U.S. troops, new
categories of images occurred that were not available from the previous Persian Gulf
War. For example, there were numerous photographs of Iraqis. The majority of these
photographs could be categorized as either pictures of Iraqi civilians greeting American
armored convoys, images of Kurdish fighters allied with U.S. and British forces, pictures
of captured Iraqi soldiers, photographs of Iraqis receiving humanitarian aid, or pictures of
crowds cheering U.S. troops (Griffin, 2004). As in 1991, categories of images that were
absent included pictures of coalition casualties (U.S. and British), damage of Iraq
bombing and war, and pictures of the Iraqi perspective (Griffin, 2004).
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The overall narrative of the 2003 invasion was “Rolling to Baghdad,” which
depicted the unstoppable military machine of the United States and culminated in Iraqi
liberation by the toppling of the Saddam regime and the destruction of Saddam’s statue
(Griffin, 2004). Griffin (2004) discussed how the ongoing conflict following the end of
the invasion confused American media’s coverage of this war. As a result, Griffin (2004)
discussed how published war images had dropped significantly, and argued a new
narrative of the conflict had yet to emerge.
Keith, Schwalbe, and Silcock (2009) applied Griffin and Lee’s (1995) methods
and found similar results in their analysis of images from the 2003 Iraq invasion. The
authors compared the visual content produced from print, television, and online media
coverage during the first five weeks of the 2003 Iraq invasion. In their content analysis of
1,822 war related images of the invasion of Iraq, researchers found little difference
between the most prevalent war frames (Keith, et al., 2009). Keith, et al., found 77
percent of the most dominant images collected of the invasion were of the arsenal/war
machine. The authors noted finding similar results to Griffin’s (2004) news magazine
study. The enemy received scant visual coverage among these three platforms, as did
Iraqi civilians, scenes of actual combat, or casualties.
Keith, et al., (2009) recognized limitations of their research, stating the data
collected only reflected differences during specific times and could not be generalized to
overall image selection by television, Internet, or print media. Also, it is important to note
the authors started their study with Griffin and Lee’s twenty-seven classifications of war
images, which they then shrunk into six categories and, in statistical analyses, further
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reduced to only three categories. Due to the sample size chosen, Keith, et al., (2009)
seemed to have only scratched the surface on analyzing these war images.
Fahmy and Kim (2008) also applied Griffin and Lee’s (1995) methods in their
visual study of the 2003 Iraq War in the American and British presses. The authors chose
to compare The New York Times and Britain’s The Guardian because both of these
newspapers tend to be more liberal and are respected worldwide for their journalism
(Fahmy & Kim, 2008, p. 448). Fahmy and Kim coded 1,099 photographs from The New
York Times and 206 photographs from The Guardian and found coverage of the Iraq War
was extremely narrow, with a focus on images of Allied troops and U.S. and British
political leaders in both newspapers. However, there were significant differences between
the press coverage. The New York Times predominantly printed images of coalition
troops (23.9 percent); then loss of civilian life in Iraq (21.2 percent); images of leaders
from the United States and Great Britain (6.4 percent); and coalition troops with Iraqi
civilians (6.1 percent) (Fahmy & Kim, 2008, p. 451). The majority of The Guardian’s
images were loss of civilian life in Iraq (20 percent); then Allied troops (11.7 percent);
and images of looters, presidential palaces, and artifacts in Iraq (10.3 percent).
The analysis revealed the British newspaper was more concerned with the
disturbance of cultural sites in Iraq because of looting and war. Also, The New York
Times printed fewer images of casualties and destruction (17.3 percent) in comparison to
The Guardian (35.5 percent) (Fahmy & Kim, 2008). Contrary to expectations, both
newspapers showed more images of Iraqi civilian casualties in comparison to images of
military fatalities.
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The British newspaper ran fewer photographs of political leaders from the United
States and Great Britain. These papers also provided fewer images of “happy encounters”
between troops and Iraqi civilians (than the U.S. media), and they printed more images of
looting and cultural artifact loss. Also, unlike The New York Times, The Guardian printed
actual combat images. Fahmy and Kim (2008) discussed how the majority of the British
public opposed the war while the American public was largely in favor of it; therefore,
the U.S. media may have represented the news in a more patriotic framework to meet the
expectations of readers, while British coverage of the invasion was more critical.
The research was organized. It provided adequate discussion of previous research
and clearly defined terms/concepts used in the study. However, the ratio of photographs
analyzed in the two newspapers should have been more proportional. With thirty-six
categories for analysis, 1,099 photographs from The New York Times provide an
overview for cursory purposes. However, the study’s analysis of only 206 photographs
from The Guardian in these thirty-six categories does not provide significant statistical
data.
Other scholars have constructed original frameworks for coding media war
images (Wells, 2007; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007), and others have narrowed
their focus to study published war images of children (Thorne, 2003; Wells 2007).
Thorne (2003) examined photographs published from the 2003 Iraq invasion in U.S.
news, European media, and Middle Eastern outlets. The author found photographs of
severely wounded children were rare in U.S. news, more prominent in European media,
and most prevalent in Middle Eastern media (Thorne, 2003). Thorne (2003) discussed the
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power of representing suffering children to “personify injustice” because “children
signify vulnerability, dependence, and innocence” (p. 261).
Wells (2007) focused on published photographs of children in British newspapers
during the Iraq invasion. The author discussed how images of children are particularly
influential when framing motivations and outcomes of war. Wells (2007) argued
oppositional visual narratives of the Iraq invasion existed in the Daily Mirror, and The
Guardian. These two narratives were: 1) Anti-war sentiments and expressions about the
illegality of the Iraq invasion (the Daily Mirror); and, 2) Skepticism of the legality of war
with liberation narratives (The Guardian).
To justify these different narratives the author displayed four published images,
discussed a few images not shown, and presented a sample of headlines. Wells (2007)
found The Guardian, although opposed to the Iraq war, did anticipate a favorable
outcome for the Iraqi people. This was revealed through images selected from The
Guardian, such as Iraqi children celebrating the fall of Saddam, smiling Iraqi children
with a British Marine, and happy Iraqi children on top of an abandoned Iraqi tank.
In contrast, the Daily Mirror focused on the illegality of the invasion of Iraq and
the suffering of the Iraqi people/children. The author discussed how the Daily Mirror
printed many of the same images as the Arab press and often included wide-angle shots
of damage resulting from the war (Wells, 2007, p. 69). Wells (2007) asserted the images
printed by the Daily Mirror were intended to expose the actions of the British
government and question the legalities of the Iraq invasion (Wells, 2007).
While the research pointed out an important area of inquiry other scholars have
not addressed, i.e. images of children; the study lacks methodological rigor. The author
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did not qualify the reasons for choosing the Daily Mirror and The Guardian, or explain
the methods used to investigate these photographs. The author failed to provide an
explicit period of study, or discuss the sample size. The narratives would be better argued
if the author explained how many photographs of children were analyzed, or if the
images were classified according to narratives, or if it was explained, how the four
photographs published within the study characterize the larger sample.
Dimitrova and Stromback (2005) also constructed an original framework for
coding war frames of articles during the Iraq invasion. The authors compared the
newspaper coverage of the elite newspapers in Sweden and the United States during the
Iraq War in 2003. The United States and Sweden were selected because of their differing
political systems, media structures, journalistic values, and positions on the Iraq War.
Dimitrova and Stromback (2005) conducted a content analysis of the leading newspapers
in both countries, the Dagens Nyheter and The New York Times. The researchers
retrieved 172 articles from Dagen Nyheter and 1,417 articles from The New York Times,
and then extracted a sample of the New York Times resulting in 236 articles. Therefore,
408 articles were analyzed under several categories. Articles were coded for specific
mentions of political leaders, and groups or countries. The types of sources cited were
classified under government official, military personnel, individual, journalist, or terrorist
group member. The tone of the war coverage was coded for positive, negative or neutral
on the U.S. position on the war. The news frames coded were military conflict (military
action, troops, equipment, etc.); human interest frame (emphasis on human participants);
responsibility frame (party/person responsible for the event); diagnostic frame (what
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caused the event); prognostic frame (possible consequences of the event); violence of war
frame; anti-war protest, and media self-reference frame (Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005).
Dimitrova and Stromback (2005) found several differences between the two
newspapers. The tone of Dagens Nyheter’s coverage was found to be more negative in
tone than The New York Times’ coverage. There were several statistically significant
differences among war frames. The U.S. was much more likely to include military
conflict and prognostic war frames, while the Swedish press included more anti-war
protest frames and responsibility frames. Also, The New York Times relied on more
official government and military sources than Dagens Nyheter. Finally, the U.S. press
focused more heavily on human-interest frames of American participants, while the
Swedish press emphasized Iraqi civilians (Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005). Overall, the
authors found the two newspapers covered the Iraq war differently in terms of tone, war
framing, and sources. While The New York Times coverage was dominated by military
conflict developments and battles, the Dagens Nyheter was more likely to report on antiwar protests and responsibility issues regarding the Iraq War (Dimitrova & Stromback,
2005).
Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) elaborated on the methods used in
Dimitrova and Stromback (2005) and applied those to visual images. The authors
compared media coverage in Egypt, Qatar, United Kingdom, and the United States.
Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) included previous research that suggested the
American public was exposed to different news coverage of the Iraq war in print and
broadcast media, in comparison to other countries. Specifically, U.S. networks ignored
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covering opposition to the war and instead provided a “sanitized picture of the war”
(Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007, p. 157).
Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) downloaded the home pages of The New
York Times (nytimes.com), The Guardian (guardian.co.uk), Al Ahram (ahram.org.eg) the
online newspaper in Egypt, and Al Jazeera (aljazeera.net) during the invasion from
March 20, 2003, to May 1, 2003. All headlines, text, and photos associated with the Iraq
War were content analyzed, totaling 112 home pages. Clear differences were found
between the Arab and Coalition online media. The most predominant frames in the Arab
media were “military conflict” and “violence of war” including heavy depiction of
destruction with military and civilian casualties (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007, p.
161). The Arab media ignored the “rebuilding of Iraq” frame in contrast to the Coalition
media (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007, p. 161). Also, the British and American
news sites focused more heavily on looting. However, there were individual differences
among the four media sites. The tone of Al Jazeera’s site was significantly more negative
than that of Al Ahram, and The Guardian used anti-war frames more often than The New
York Times.
Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) concluded the differences in framing
suggest that Arab and Coalition media portrayed “different tales of the same war” in their
online news coverage (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007, p. 162). While the Arab
online audience saw a war with heavy military and civilian casualties represented in
online images, the Coalition media emphasized the long-term benefits of a democratic
government resulting from war. Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) pointed to public
opinion of host countries as the most likely reason for variations of war coverage. The
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authors were successful in adding to the few studies that have conducted comparative
analyses and included the Arab world. However, within the study they classified western
journalistic practices as objective, an arguable assertion. Future research would benefit by
consistent methodologies for comparing war coverage.
Hammond (2003) examined the role of media, specifically U.S. and U.K.
journalists in representing images that are supportive or critical of the war in Iraq.
Hammond (2003) discussed the highly “image-conscious” media and stated that
“producing the right image” is just as important as achieving tangible results on the
ground (p. 23). Hammond (2003) discussed the role of U.S. media campaigns in filming
military soldiers performing “heart-warming duties” including helping injured Iraqi
children (p. 26). U.K. media was found to be much more critical, questioning the validity
of the war and nature of U.S. media images. One BBC correspondent predicted the Iraq
war would be “justified in the lofty rhetoric of human rights,” warning his audience: “Get
ready for a new generation of heart-wrenching images” (Hammond, 2003, p. 34).
Susan Carruthers (2008) in “No one’s looking: the disappearing audience for war”
discussed the American public’s apathy for the war. Carruthers (2008) discussed how the
Iraq war has become largely unpopular in the U.S., but has been unable to stir animation,
emotion, or unrest from its citizens. Television airtime for Iraq has dwindled; embedded
reporters have become too expensive financially and too dangerous (claiming the lives of
110 journalists).
Efforts by independent filmmakers and some Hollywood efforts to cover the Iraq
war have found disinterested American audiences. The insurgency has become old news,
despite the large amount of visual images and growing films available online and through
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foreign news sources. Carruthers (2008) discussed the debate on Capitol Hill on when
and how to “draw down” the troops; however, the disconnected American public has not
called for any critical account or inspection of the war efforts and their effects. Carruthers
(2008) concludes with a call for future research on these “contemporary peculiarities” of
anemic dissent (p. 74).
The results and methods from Griffin and Lee’s (1995) Persian Gulf War study
influenced later research investigating war reporting. Building upon previous research
methods for visual content analyses helps to build a more solid framework for future
studies. From the literature, it is evident that disparate media coverage of the Iraq
invasion across media platforms and/or countries exists. Griffin’s (2004) study identified
a change in the framing of the war by American media after the invasion of Iraq, an area
ripe for further examination.
How the American and British media continued to cover the Iraq War eight years
after President Bush declared mission accomplished needs to be analyzed. Updated
research on how the American and British presses continued to cover such a controversial
war provides insight to the complex relationships between government, international
interests, the public’s right to know, and the press.
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CHAPTER TWO
METHODS

The literature on tone, framing of war, and war narratives has revealed differential
visual coverage during the 2003 Iraq invasion period. This thesis compares the
newspapers of the Coalition forces; the United States through The New York Times and
the United Kingdom through The Guardian for two months during the occupation period
(selecting 2006), and five weeks leading up to the designated end/closure of the war in
2011. To examine visual differences depicted within the publications, the study will
explore the following research questions:
RQ1: How will The New York Times and The Guardian compare in their
frequency of published images, size and placement in 2006 and 2011?
RQ2: How did the The New York Times and The Guardian compare in their
newspaper coverage after the invasion period in 2006 and 2011 in terms of
war frames and narratives?
RQ3: Did the war frames, and narratives change over time within each
newspaper? If so, how?
Based on the review of literature, the following hypotheses are proposed:
H1: The New York Times will publish a higher frequency of images than The
Guardian in their respective newspapers, but the size and placement of the
images will be similar.
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H2: The Guardian will include more critical coverage of the Iraq War than The
New York Times in 2006 and 2011.
H3: Both newspapers will include more frames depicting violence, destruction,
and societal chaos of war in 2006; and the 2011 coverage will focus on the
departing troops and include much less critical and graphic images of the
war.
In utilizing The New York Times and The Guardian to represent newspaper coverage
from the United States and the United Kingdom, this research is replicating an earlier
study by Fahmy and Kim (2008) that analyzed the invasion period. This study chose to
analyze images, which often after a conflict becomes iconic historical representations of
previous wars. This study chose to examine war periods beyond the initial invasions in
order to compare and analyze how news organizations represent and cover long-term
conflicts that were initially intended to be short-term excursions. By uncovering how
these two newspapers visually represented the Iraq War in 2006 and 2011 new insight
can be brought to how these news organizations and countries positioned the war in
informing the public of the progress and close of the war.
This study provides a comparative analysis of war images from the American and
British presses. A content analysis of published Iraq War images was conducted using
The New York Times and The Guardian. In order to access these images, microform
copies of the newspapers were analyzed. This study was not able to utilize digital
databases of these newspapers, as the digitized versions often exclude the photographic
images printed with the news stories for copyright purposes. This study analyzes Iraq
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War images and utilizes headlines and photographic captions as references in coding the
American and British presses.
The New York Times and The Guardian were chosen for their journalistic quality
and international prestige. These newspapers serve as important mouthpieces for the
presses for the United States and the United Kingdom. Previous studies have utilized the
print or online version of The New York Times (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007;
Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005) and The Guardian (Dimitrova &
Connolly-Ahern, 2007, Fahmy & Kim, 2008) to represent newspaper coverage from their
respective countries.
The research focused on images from two distinct periods after the 2003 invasion,
in 2006 and 2011(the middle and end of the war respectively). These two periods,
drawing from sources in The New York Times and The Guardian, feature moments from
the occupation, and the close of the war. The occupation period was chosen for the end of
2006, when the Associated Press reported the largest amount of war casualties.
Therefore, the months of November and December in 2006, were determined to be
especially newsworthy period during the war. The examination included materials from
the month leading up to the official end, between November 18, 2011, and December 21,
2011.
The unit of analysis chosen in this study was the individual news photograph,
although surrounding content including captions and articles was taken into account
while coding. Every photograph within the two periods that portrays the Iraq War will be
analyzed. Images were collected from the main news sections (the first few pages), from
the International sections, National news sections, and the Metro sections. The following
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sections with images were excluded: Business; Editorial (comment and analysis, and
cartoon depictions); special features presented at the back of the newspaper; and
published advertisements pertaining to the war.
Also one of the limitations of the study was that The Guardian does not publish
on Sundays and did not publish on several holidays that The New York Times did, which
might have affected the frequency of images published. The following were dates that
publications occurred for The New York Times but were absent for The Guardian:
11/5/2006, 11/12/2006, 11/19/2006, 11/26/2006, 12/3/2006, 12/10/2006, 12/17/2006,
12/24/2006, 12/25/2006, 12/26/2006, 12/31/2006, 11/6/2011, 11/13/2011, 11/20/2011,
11/27/2011, 12/4/2011, 12/11/2011, 12/18/2011, and 12/25/2011.
This study merged classification categories from previous literature, including
Griffin and Lee (1995); Griffin (2004); Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007); and King
and Lester (2005). Also, new classification categories were introduced that have not been
previously applied in visual analyses of war to elaborate on previous war frames. Griffin
and Lee’s (1995) and Griffin’s (2004) categories were centered on coding manifest
content, items that are more concrete and recognizable. Also, these categories are
mutually exclusive; therefore, an image could only be classified under a single category.
Griffin and Lee’s (1995) and Griffin’s (2004) methods for coding include the
following classifications (some categories have been modified to reflect the Iraq War):
arsenal/noncombat (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.); (Iraq);
civilian casualties (U.S. and U.K.); (Iraqi);
civilian life (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.);
combat (all nations);
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damage and destruction (Iraq);
ecological subjects;
historical photos (All nations);
media;
military casualties (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.); (Iraq);
military leaders (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.); (Iraq);
oil and energy;
political leaders (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.); (Iraq); (Arab world, excluding
Iraq); (United Nations, and others, excluding Arab and Coalition leaders);
prisoners of war (POWs) (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.); (Iraq);
public demonstrations (Coalition nations, U.S. and U.K.); (Arab);
troops/noncombat (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.); (Iraq);
wartime civilian life (Iraq);
and other.
Scholars including, Griffin (2004), Fahmy and Kim (2008), Keith, Schwalbe, and Silcock
(2009) have utilized Griffin and Lee’s (1995) coding as a baseline and have merged or
adjusted categories.
Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) coded manifest and latent content, which
includes underlying meanings of communications in their study. Their coding includes
classifications that are mutually exclusive and others that are not. Classifications for tone
were mutually exclusive: items were coded as positive toward the U.S. position on the
war; negative toward the U.S. position on the war; or neutral/mixed — i.e., neither
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clearly positive nor clearly negative toward the U.S. position on the war. The war frames
the authors coded were not mutually exclusive, these categories included:
anti-war protest;
diagnostic frame (reasons for leading to war);
human interest (focus on human participants);
looting frame;
media self-reference (emphasis of the role of journalists);
oil resources frame;
prognostic frame (long-term effects of the war);
rebuilding of Iraq;
responsibility frame (looking for blame);
violence of war (destruction and human cost of war);
and war frames (military conflict, focus on troops and military developments);
Also, the type of sources cited were coded (government official, military personnel,
individual journalist, terrorist group member, and other). Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern
(2007) also coded the use of negative moral terms within their study.
King & Lester’s (2005) study analyzed the first week of the start of the ground
war in 1991 and 2003. The unit of analysis for the study was the individual photograph,
and all the images were classified under one of ten categories: fighting scenes, deceased
soldiers, battlefield scenes, prisoners, civilians, home front subjects, protestors, portraits,
and miscellaneous. Also, the images were coded for source (staff photographer, pool
photographer, miscellaneous); page selection (front page, front section, or second
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section); page placement (top, middle, or lower third); photographic perspective; and size
of photograph.
In coding for war frames, this study applied a combination of Dimitrova and
Connolly-Ahern’s (2007), Griffin and Lee’s (1995), and King and Lester’s (2005)
methods. Originally this study intended to code for tone, positive, negative, or
neutral/mixed; however, the images in 2006 included complex messages making the
coding process too difficult to delineate between negative and neutral/mixed tone. Also,
while positive tone was a category, it was not anticipated that any images would be
classified under this category. Some categories from Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern’s
(2007), Griffin and Lee’s (1995), and King and Lester’s (2005) studies were merged, and
some categories were introduced, such as Iraq study group, Saddam’s trial, Donald
Rumsfeld’s exiting as defense secretary, societal chaos of war, and war atrocities.
Within the classifications of war frames, this study will emulate Dimitrova and
Connolly-Ahern’s (2007) methods — where the category of war frames is not mutually
exclusive. Images often include several elements and competing messages; therefore,
images within this study can be categorized as being in more than one war frame
category. However, this study will mitigate the overlap of categories by the explicitness
of the classifications. Also, the use of headlines and captions within the publications will
be instrumental in coding the war frames appropriately.
The following categories analyzed within this study are as follows:
Anti-war Protest; or anti-U.S. or anti-U.K. public demonstration (Coalition or
Arab countries): These images include an individual or assembly of people either
protesting against the Iraq War or against the intervention of the invading forces in Iraq.
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Atrocities and/or Scandals of War (committed by Coalition military, Saddam’s
regime, or the Iraqi government): These are clearly defined atrocities or scandals where
the headlines or captions define the actions as illegal, abuse, rape, and/or unnecessary
torture. Often as a result, a trial or official investigation is or was underway within the
publication.
Coalition Military Troops: This denotes a visual presence of coalition military
troops, and these images are only coded in this category if they are not already coded
under wounded coalition soldiers, human cost of war for coalition troops, human-interest
stories, or atrocities by coalition soldiers.
Coalition Troop Withdrawal: This category is only represented for events during
the year 2011, during the withdrawal of Coalition military. These images include visual
representations of packing to leave Iraq, traveling out of Iraq, and arriving in the U.S.
after leaving Iraq.
Diagnostic Frame: Refers to images that are visual representations of the reasons
leading to war from the invading forces’ perspective. Images of Saddam Hussein, other
defined enemies, and/or enemy weapons will be classified under this category.
Donald Rumsfeld’s Exiting as Defense Secretary: Rumsfeld lost political support
as the Iraq War continued and resigned in late 2006. Images of Rumsfeld’s departure
were separated from images of political figures because his resignation signaled a change
in how the war would be handled.
Human Cost of War (Coalition soldiers or Iraqi casualties): These images
represent loss; coffins, gravesites, military photos of the deceased, funeral processions,
and visible grieving by family or loved ones. The caption of some images may mention
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casualties occurred from bombings or other activities, but unless the images show a
visual representation of loss as expressed above they are not classified as human cost of
war.
Human-Interest Stories (Iraqi civilians, Iraqi military/police, Coalition soldiers,
Coalition civilians): These images emphasize the human participants in the event. The
captions of these images include the name/s of the people depicted within the images,
which is also referenced within the articles that correspond to the images. Images are not
double coded as human interest and as Iraqi civilian, Iraqi police, or coalition military
troops. However, if there are other people in the background of an image that are not
referenced by name then these other categories can be included. Iraqi prisoners were not
included as human interest stories, often the prisoners are referenced by name within the
captions, but usually in terms of discussing the crime or the context surrounding the
imprisonment. Also, human cost of war was not included under human interest story.
However, if the image was of a grieving family member and included the name of the
family member grieving — it was coded for human cost of war for coalition casualties
and human interest story for coalition civilians.
Iraq Study Group: This war frame category was only included during events in
the year 2006. The Iraq study group refers to a panel of individuals selected to investigate
the progress and ongoing situation of the Iraq War, and make recommendations as to the
future course of the involvement from the U.S. and U.K.
Iraqi Civilians: This denotes a visual presence of Iraqi civilians, these images are
only coded in this category if they are not already coded under human-interest stories,
antiwar protest, or cheering celebrating an event associated with the war.
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Iraqi Police/Military: This denotes a visual presence of Iraqi policy/military;
these images are only coded in this category if they are not already coded under humaninterest stories of Iraqi military.
Iraqi Prisoners/Prisons (not Saddam): This denotes a visual presence of Iraqi
prisoners or prisons
Military Activity: This is Coalition activity and images of Coalition military
arsenal and military conflict. In 2006, this may include military patrols and withdrawal or
change of military bases in Iraq; however, this does not include the military withdrawal
from Iraq in 2011.
Political Figures: These are images of political figures from Coalition or Arab
countries including presidents, prime ministers, cabinet members, members of congress,
high-ranking military officials, and other public officials. These images do not include
images of Saddam.
Rebuilding of Iraq: These images show how Coalition forces or Iraqis are
involved in rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure through roads, bridges, buildings, etc. Also,
images depicting democratic progress (through voting, or other areas) would also fall into
this category.
Saddam’s Trial: In 2006, Saddam’s trial was highly publicized, these are images
around the trial, but do not include images of Saddam.
Societal Chaos of War, and/or Bombings and Insurgent Activity: The captions of
these images mention bombings and/or insurgent activity; they may also refer to negative
consequences or aftermath that was a direct result of insurgent activity.
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Violence/Destruction of War: These images may include fire, bullets, violence,
visible bloodshed, and/or destruction of buildings or infrastructure. These photographs
may show graphic images of slain bodies, however, if the bodies are covered by a sheet, a
body bag, or coffin and do not show blood they will be classified under human cost of
war.
Wounded Disabled (Coalition soldiers or Iraqis): These photographs may contain
images of fresh injuries or fully healed injuries that result in disfigurement or
amputations. If the images are fresh and blood is visible, the images are also classified as
violence/destruction of war.
Other: War frames that cannot be classified under any other category listed above.
After all data were coded, the most predominant frames, as well as
underrepresented categories, were further analyzed for the findings section. The most
highly represented frames were grouped into representative narratives that discuss the
overall tone of the war coverage during these three periods of investigation. The largest
obstacle this study faced involves ensuring inter-coder reliability that becomes more
difficult when latent content was coded. Also, it was anticipated that coding reliability
might become difficult because some photographs may be in more than one war frame;
however, with pilot coding training and testing — this study mitigated those problems, as
reflected in the following chapter. Chapter Three describes the findings of the methods
previously described.
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Intercoder Reliability
In order to test for intercoder reliability, 10 percent of the 377-sample size was
tested. The researcher coded all of the images, and a graduate student in Journalism and
Media Studies coded the first 38 images in the sample size. A Kappa test was run on all
of the war frames and categories. Intercoder reliability analysis by Landis and Koch
(1977) was utilized for the interpretation of results. The following categories had perfect
agreement at the Kappa value of 1: diagnostic frame, political coalition figures, military
activity, antiwar protests from Arab countries, human-interest stories of Coalition
civilians, and societal chaos of war.
The following categories were mutually agreed upon as not being represented in
the 38 sample size: Saddam trial; political Arab figures; Iraqi military; Iraqi
prisoners/prisons; rebuilding Iraq frame; anti-war protest from Coalition countries;
human interest stories of Iraqi civilians; human interest stories of Iraqi military; atrocities
by Saddam’s regime; atrocities by Iraqi regime; Iraqi study group; returning Coalition
soldiers; and other. The frames that were found to be in substantial agreement (between
0.61-0.80) were: Donald Rumsfeld exiting as Defense Secretary (0.64); Coalition troops
(0.72); human cost of war for Coalition casualties (0.80); human cost of war for Iraqi
casualties (0.64); and wounded Coalition soldiers (0.64). Photograph size was found to be
in moderate agreement at 0.41 (between 0.41-0.60). The following categories were found
to be in fair agreement (between 0.21-0.40): Iraqi civilians (0.29); violence/destruction of
war (0.31); wounded Iraqis (0.31); celebrating events of war from Coalition countries
(0.31); celebrating events of war from Arab countries (0.31); human interest stories of
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Coalition soldiers (0.31); and atrocities of Coalition military (0.31). (The complete Kappa
tests are located in Appendix I).
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CHAPTER THREE
FINDINGS
The study included 377 images were collected from The Guardian and The New
York Times from microfilm. These images were taken from newspapers from November
1, 2006, to December 31, 2006, and from November 18, 2011, to December 21, 2011.
The 2006 images were collected over a two-month period that coincided with one of the
bloodiest times during the Iraq war, with the largest amount of civilian casualties reported
by the Associated Press. On December 15, 2011, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta
declared the Iraq War over, and the last U.S. troops left Iraq on December 18, 2011,
marking the end of the war. Therefore, November 18, 2011, to December 21, 2011, was
selected to collect images corresponding to the end of the conflict.
RQ1: How will The New York Times and The Guardian compare in their
frequency of published images, size, and placement in their newspapers in 2006 and
2011?
In order to answer RQ1, frequencies of the published Iraq images were run in
both newspapers. The sizes of the published images were compared in both The New
York Times and The Guardian. Finally, images were analyzed according to which page
number the image was published within the newspapers.
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Frequencies
The study sampled 293 images were collected from The New York Times, and 84
images were collected from The Guardian during both periods. The New York Times
published images of the Iraq War much more frequently during both time periods with a
total of 77.7 percent compared to 22.3 percent of images published from The Guardian.
However, the proportion of images both newspapers printed during these periods were
very similar, which may reflect consistent editorial styles. For The New York Times, 86
percent of their total images were printed in 2006 versus 14 percent in 2011.
Comparatively, The Guardian printed 82.1 percent of their total images in 2006 versus
17.9 percent in 2011.

TABLE 1: Crosstabs New York Times and The Guardian in 2006 and 2011
Date
Newspaper

New York Times

The Guardian

Total

Count
% within newspaper
% within Date
% of Total
Count
% within newspaper
% within Date
% of Total
Count
% within newspaper
% within Date
% of Total
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2006
252
86.0%
78.5%
66.8%
69
82.1%
21.5%
18.3%
321
85.1%
100.0%
85.1%

2011
41
14.0%
73.2%
10.9%
15
17.9%
26.8%
4.0%
56
14.9%
100.0%
14.9%

Total
293
100.0%
77.7%
77.7%
84
100.0%
22.3%
22.3%
377
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

There is not a significant statistical difference in comparing the newspapers and the date
of published images; the p value for the Chi Square test is .380. (The complete Chi
Square test is found in Table 1 in Appendix I).

Size
The study included the category of size for classification, the larger an image is
printed, the more prominent its visual representation on the page. Within the study, large
images were defined as one quarter of the page or larger. Medium images were less than
a quarter and larger than one-twelfth of the page, and small images were one-twelfth of
the page or smaller. Also, images the size of a thumbnail or smaller were excluded from
the study. The Guardian was much more likely to publish large images over The New
York Times at 19 percent compared to 3.4 percent. The majority of images in both
newspapers were medium or small with medium being the predominant size photograph
in both newspapers. 55.3 percent of The New York Times images and 42.9 percent of The
Guardian images were medium. The relationship between the photograph size published
and newspaper was found to be statistically significant at the p value of .000, a highly
significant difference. (The complete Chi Square test is found in Table 2 in Appendix I).
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TABLE 2: Crosstabs New York Times and The Guardian and Photograph size

Newspaper New York Times

The Guardian

Total

Count
% within newspaper

photosize4
Large
Medium
10
162

Small
121

3.4%

55.3%

41.3%

% within photosize4
% of Total
Count
% within newspaper

38.5%
2.7%
16

81.8%
43.0%
36

79.1%
32.1%
32

19.0%

42.9%

38.1%

% within photosize4
% of Total
Count
% within newspaper

61.5%
4.2%
26

18.2%
9.5%
198

20.9%
8.5%
153

6.9%

52.5%

40.6%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

6.9%

52.5%

40.6%

% within photosize4
% of Total

Total
293
100.0
%
77.7%
77.7%
84
100.0
%
22.3%
22.3%
377
100.0
%
100.0
%
100.0
%

Placement
Finally, to finish answering RQ1, images were analyzed according to which page
number the image was published within the newspapers. This uses the premise that the
closeness to the front page equates to prominence of the image. For the study,
“ppublish3” refers to the page on which the image was published, with the pages the
images were printed on ranging from 1 to 47 and were broken down into three categories
designated as “1,” “2,” and “3.” The first category, 1, means the image was printed on the
front page of the newspaper. The second category, 2, means the image was printed
somewhere between pages 2 and 15 — the section directly after the front page. Finally,
the third category means the image was printed somewhere from page 16 to 47. All of the
images collected were only from the front of the newspaper including the national,
international, and metro sections. For both newspapers, once the researcher got to the
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finance or business sections of the publications the image collection stopped. Therefore,
no images were collected under business/finance or in the remaining sections that
included arts and leisure, sports, comment and analysis/editorial, or other later sections.
Through Chi-Square analysis a statistically significant difference between
newspaper and page images of the Iraq War were published was not found. (The
complete Chi Square test is found in Table 3 in Appendix I). This may help make the
argument that both newspapers have made similar editorial decisions on image
prominence according to the page number images were published. While a statistically
significant difference was not found based on image placement, there were some
differences between the two newspapers. First, The New York Times was slightly more
likely to publish images relating to the Iraq War on the front page of their newspaper with
10.2 percent compared to The Guardian’s 8.3 percent. Also, the majority of images
published in both newspapers were in the second and third sections, which makes sense
because the second and third sections range from page 2 to page 47. However, where the
majority of images are published for both newspapers is different. While 53.2 percent of
images in The New York Times are published in the second section, 46.4 percent (the
majority) of The Guardian’s images are published in the third section. Therefore, there is
a slight difference in prominence in comparing both newspapers. The Guardian is
slightly more likely to bury images of the Iraq War in their newspaper as compared to
The New York Times. Finally, hypothesis one can be revisited and answered.
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TABLE 3: Crosstabs New York Times and The Guardian and Page Published
1.00
Newspaper New York Times

The Guardian

Total

Count
% within newspaper
% within ppublish3
% of Total
Count
% within newspaper
% within ppublish3
% of Total
Count
% within newspaper
% within ppublish3
% of Total

30
10.2%
81.1%
8.0%
7
8.3%
18.9%
1.9%
37
9.8%
100.0%
9.8%

ppublish3
2.00
156
53.2%
80.4%
41.4%
38
45.2%
19.6%
10.1%
194
51.5%
100.0%
51.5%

3.00
107
36.5%
73.3%
28.4%
39
46.4%
26.7%
10.3%
146
38.7%
100.0%
38.7%

Total
293
100.0%
77.7%
77.7%
84
100.0%
22.3%
22.3%
377
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

H1: The New York Times will publish a higher frequency of images than The Guardian in
their respective newspapers, but the size and placement of the images will be similar.
In answering H1, The New York Times did publish a higher frequency of images than The
Guardian in their respective newspapers.
This is a logical occurrence since the United States had deployed more troops to
Iraq and had arguably a larger stake in its success or failings than the United Kingdom.
Also, the image placement or what page the image was published was also found to be
similar. However, image size was found to be statistically different based on the two
newspapers with The Guardian more likely to publish large images over The New York
Times and give the Iraq War images more prominence according to size. Therefore, based
on the evidence H1 was partially supported.
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TABLE 4: Crosstabs Page Published and Photograph Size
Large
Ppublish3

1.00

2.00

3.00

Total

Count
% within ppublish3
% within photosize4
% of Total
Count
% within ppublish3
% within photosize4
% of Total
Count
% within ppublish3
% within photosize4
% of Total
Count
% within ppublish3
% within photosize4
% of Total

0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
15
7.7%
57.7%
4.0%
11
7.5%
42.3%
2.9%
26
6.9%
100.0%
6.9%

Photosize4
Medium
28
75.7%
14.1%
7.4%
99
51.0%
50.0%
26.3%
71
48.6%
35.9%
18.8%
198
52.5%
100.0%
52.5%

Small
9
24.3%
5.9%
2.4%
80
41.2%
52.3%
21.2%
64
43.8%
41.8%
17.0%
153
40.6%
100.0%
40.6%

Total
37
100.0%
9.8%
9.8%
194
100.0%
51.5%
51.5%
146
100.0%
38.7%
38.7%
377
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

During the compiling of data, a crosstabulation comparing image placement and
photograph size was also run to see if a difference exists. This analysis included both
newspapers and found a pattern in both publications. There was a statistically significant
difference based on photograph placement and size with a p-value of .042. (The complete
Chi Square test is found in Table 4 in Appendix I). For both newspapers there were no
large images printed on the front page, most likely because images compete for major
stories on the front page of newspapers.
The majority of front-page images in both newspapers were in the medium size
category. The majority of all images published were of the medium size in both
newspapers at 52.5 percent. The largest amount of images in any one section was
medium images in the second section of the newspaper located from page 2 to 15, most
likely because in 2006 and 2011 the Iraq War had been going on for several years, and
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while some stories and images on the war made the front pages of both newspapers on
occasion, the majority of the time the images were located in the second section of both
newspapers.

Analysis of Frames

RQ2: How did The New York Times and The Guardian compare in their
newspaper coverage after the invasion period in 2006 and 2011 in terms of war frames
and narratives?
In order to answer RQ2, the image categories and war frames need to be analyzed.
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TABLE 5: Newspaper Frames
Newspaper Frame
Diagnostic frame
(Enemies/Weapons)
Saddam Trial (Not Saddam,
only in 2006)
Political Coalition Figures
Political Arab Figures (Not
Saddam)
Rumsfeld Exiting as Defense
Secretary (2006)
Military Conflict/ Developments
Coalition Troops
Iraqi Military
Iraqi Civilians
Iraqi Prisoners/Prisons
Rebuilding of Iraq
Violence/Destruction of war
Human cost of war Coalition
casualties
Human cost of war Iraqi
casualties
Wounded Coalition soldiers
Wounded Iraqis
Protests from Arab countries
Protests from Coalition
Countries
Celebrating from Coalition
Countries
Celebrating from Arab
Countries
Human interest stories (Iraq
Civilians)
Human interest stories (Iraq
Military)
Human interest stories
(Coalition Military)
Human interest stories
(Coalition Civilians)
Societal Chaos of War
Atrocities by Coalition Soldiers
Atrocities by Saddam’s regime
Atrocities by Iraqi regime
Iraq Study Group (2006 only)
Returning Coalition Soldiers
(2011 only)
Other
Total

NY
Times
(2006)
16

Guardian
(2006)

Guardian
(2011)

All
Media

Percent
of Total

6

NY
Times
(2011)
0

1

23/377

6.1%

6

0

0

0

6/321

47
18

16
0

7
3

1
2

71/377
23/377

1.9%
(2006)
18.8%
6.1%

8

4

0

0

12/321

23
35
12
59
8
0
25
3

4
9
1
7
1
1
6
13

1
15
2
6
3
1
0
0

2
6
1
2
2
0
1
0

30/377
65/377
16/377
74/377
14/377
2/377
32/377
16/377

3.7%
(2006)
8.0%
17.2%
4.2%
19.6%
3.7%
0.5%
8.5%
4.2%

31

4

2

1

38/377

10.1%

7
4
5
1

3
2
2
0

1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

11/377
6/377
7/377
1/377

2.9%
1.6%
1.9%
0.3%

1

2

1

2

6/377

1.6%

2

1

1

0

4/377

1.1%

15

0

4

0

19/377

5.0%

1

0

0

0

1/377

0.3%

10

1

3

3

44/377

12.0%

9

3

0

0

12/377

3.2%

38
4
1
1
9
0

4
2
0
0
1
0

2
2
0
1
0
11

0
3
0
0
0
3

44/377
11/377
1/377
2/377
10/321
14/56

11.7%
2.9%
0.3%
0.5%
3.1%
25.0%

10
252

1
69

1
41

0
15

12/377
377/377

3.2%
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Diagnostic Frame: Refers to images that are visual representations of the reasons
leading to war from the invading forces’ perspective. Images of Saddam Hussein, other
defined enemies, and/or enemy weapons will be classified under this category. Of the
377-picture sample, 6.1 percent of images were categorized under the diagnostic frame
for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 6.9 percent of the
images were categorized diagnostic with 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing the diagnostic
frame between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was no statistical difference
for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all
of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square test is
found in Table 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 6: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Diagnostic Frame
saddam5
Yes
Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

No
16
7
23

Total

Total
277
77
354

293
84
377

Saddam’s Trial: In 2006, Saddam’s trial was highly publicized, these are images
around the trial, but do not include images of Saddam. Of the 321-sample size of 2006,
only 1.9 percent of images were in this category. In comparing the Saddam’s trial frame
between The New York Times and The Guardian, there were no statistical differences for
images published between the two newspapers. (The complete Chi-Square test is found in
Table 6 in Appendix I).
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TABLE 7: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Saddam Trial Frame
Saddamtrial6
Yes
Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

No
6
0
6

Total

Total
287
84
371

293
84
377

Political Figures: These are images of political figures from Coalition or Arab
countries including presidents, prime ministers, cabinet members, members of congress,
high-ranking military officials, and other public officials. Also, these images do not
include images of Saddam. Of the 377-picture sample, 18.8 percent of images were
categorized under the political Coalition figures frame for both newspapers. When
comparing the years individually, in 2006, 19.6 percent of the images were categorized
political Coalition figures with 14.3 percent in 2011. In comparing the political Coalition
figures frame between The New York Times and The Guardian, there were no statistical
differences for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when
comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete ChiSquare tests are found in Table 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 in Appendix I).
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TABLE 8: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Political Coalition Figures Frame

newspaper

polcoalition7
Yes
54
17
71

New York Times
The Guardian

Total

No

Total
239
67
306

293
84
377

	
  
	
  

TABLE 9: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Political Arab Figures Frame
polarab8
Yes
newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

No
21
2
23

Total

Total
272
82
354

293
84
377

For the political Arab countries frame 6.1 percent of the 377-picture sample was
categorized under this frame. When comparing the political Arab countries frame
between the two newspapers there was some variance. If both 2006 and 2011 are
included in the comparison, there were no statistical differences between newspapers.
However, when just 2006 is isolated, there was a statistically significant difference at the
.022 level. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3 in
Appendix II).

Donald Rumsfeld’s Exiting as Defense Secretary: Rumsfeld lost political support
as the Iraq War continued and resigned in late 2006. Images of Rumsfeld’s departure
were separated from images of political figures because his resignation signaled a change
in how the war would be handled. Of the 321-sample size for 2006, 3.7 percent of images
were categorized under Donald Rumsfeld’s exiting as defense secretary frame for both
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newspapers. In comparing the Donald Rumsfeld exiting frame between The New York
Times and The Guardian, there were no statistical differences for images published
between the two newspapers. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 9 in
Appendix II).

TABLE 10: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Donald Rumsfeld Exiting Frame
rumsfeld9
Yes
newspape New York Times
r
The Guardian
Total

Count
% within rumsfeld9
Count
% within rumsfeld9
Count
% within rumsfeld9

8
66.7%
4
33.3%
12
100.0%

No

Total

244
79.0%
65
21.0%
309
100.0%

252
78.5%
69
21.5%
321
100.0%

Military Activity: This is Coalition activity and images of Coalition military
arsenal and military conflict. In 2006, this may include military patrols and withdrawal or
change of military bases in Iraq; however, this does not include the military withdrawal
from Iraq in 2011. For the military activity frame, 8.0 percent of the 377-picture sample
was categorized under this frame for both newspapers. When comparing the years
individually, in 2006, 8.4 percent of the images were categorized under military activity
with 5.4 percent in 2011. In comparing the military activity frame between The New York
Times and The Guardian, there was no statistical difference for images published
between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011
and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 10.1,
10.2, and 10.3 in Appendix I).
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TABLE 11: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Military Conflict Frame
mconflict10
Yes
Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

No
24
6
30

Total

Total
269
78
347

293
84
377

Coalition Military Troops: This denotes a visual presence of coalition military
troops, and these images are only coded in this category if they are not already coded
under wounded coalition soldiers, human cost of war for coalition troops, human-interest
stories, or atrocities by coalition soldiers. Of the 377-picture sample, 17.2 percent of
images were categorized under the Coalition military troops category for both
newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 13.7 percent of the images
were categorized Coalition military troops with 37.5 percent in 2011. In comparing the
Coalition military troops category between The New York Times and The Guardian, there
was no statistical difference in the amount of images published between the two
newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually
based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 11.1, 11.2, and 11.3 in
Appendix I).

TABLE 12: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Coalition Troops Frame
coaltroops11
Yes
Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

No
50
15
65

Total
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Total
243
69
312

293
84
377

Iraqi Police/Military: This denotes a visual presence of Iraqi policy/military;
these images are only coded in this category if they are not already coded under humaninterest stories of Iraqi military. Within the 377-picture sample, 4.2 percent of images
were categorized under the Iraqi police/military for both newspapers. When comparing
the years individually, in 2006, 4.0 percent of the images were categorized Iraqi
police/military with 5.4 percent in 2011. In comparing the Iraqi military troops category
between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was no statistical difference in the
amount of images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when
comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete ChiSquare tests are found in Table 12.1, 12.2, and 12.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 13: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Iraqi Military Frame

newspaper

iraqipolicemil12
Yes
No
14
2
16

New York Times
The Guardian

Total

Total
279
82
361

293
84
377

Iraqi Civilians: This denotes a visual presence of Iraqi civilians, these images are
only coded in this category if they are not already coded under human-interest stories,
antiwar protest, or cheering celebrating an event associated with the war. Of the 377picture sample, 19.6 percent of images were categorized under the Iraqi civilians for both
newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 20.6 percent of the images
were categorized Iraqi civilians with 14.3 percent in 2011. In comparing the Iraqi
civilians category between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was a
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significant statistical difference at the .020 level in the amount of images published
between the two newspapers when comparing both years. When isolating for 2006, the
statistical relationship is even higher at the .016 level. However, when comparing only
2011 the difference is no longer significant and is at the .90 level. (The complete ChiSquare tests are found in Table 13.1, 13.2, and 13.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 14: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Iraqi Civilians Frame
iraqicivil13
Yes
Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

No
65
9
74

Total

Total
228
75
303

293
84
377

Iraqi Prisoners/Prisons (not Saddam): This denotes a visual presence of Iraqi
prisoners or prisons. For the 377-picture sample, 3.7 percent of images were categorized
under the Iraqi prisoners/prisons for both newspapers. When comparing the years
individually, in 2006, 2.8 percent of the images were categorized Iraqi prisoners with 8.9
percent in 2011. In comparing the Iraqi prisoners’ category between The New York Times
and The Guardian, there was no statistical difference for images published between the
two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and
individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 14.1, 14.2,
and 14.3 in Appendix I).
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TABLE 15: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Iraqi Prison Frame

newspaper

iraqipprison14
Yes
11
3
14

New York Times
The Guardian

Total

No

Total
282
81
363

293
84
377

Rebuilding of Iraq: These images show how Coalition forces or Iraqis are
involved in rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure through roads, bridges, buildings, etc. (this
also includes repurposed buildings). Also, images depicting democratic progress (through
voting, or other areas) would also fall into this category. Of the 377-picture sample, 0.5
percent of images were categorized under the rebuilding of Iraq frame for both
newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 0.3 percent of the images
were categorized rebuilding of Iraq 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing the rebuilding of
Iraq frame between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was no statistical
difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when
comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete ChiSquare tests are found in Table 15.1, 15.2, and 15.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 16: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Rebuilding Iraq Frame
rebuiliraq15
Yes
Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

No
1
1
2

Total
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Total
292
83
375

293
84
377

Violence/destruction of war – these images may include fire, bullets, violence,
visible bloodshed and/or destruction of buildings or infrastructure. These photographs
may show graphic images of slain bodies, however, if the bodies are covered by a sheet, a
body bag, or coffin and do not show blood they will be classified under human cost of
war. Within the 377-picture sample, 8.5 percent of images were categorized under the
violence/destruction of war frame for both newspapers. When comparing the years
individually, in 2006, 9.7 percent of the images were categorized violence/destruction of
war 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing the violence/destruction of war frame between The
New York Times and The Guardian, there was no statistical difference for images
published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006
with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in
Table 16.1, 16.2, and 16.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 17: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Violence/Destruction Frame

Newspaper

violdestruc16
Yes
25
7
32

New York Times
The Guardian

Total

No

Total
268
77
345

293
84
377

Human cost of war (Coalition soldiers or Iraqi casualties) – these images
represent loss, this may be visualized by coffins, gravesites, military photos of the
deceased, funeral processions, and visible grieving by family or loved ones. The caption
of some images may mention casualties occurred from bombings or other activities, but
unless the images show a visual representation of loss as expressed above they are not
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classified as human cost of war. Of the 377 total sample, 4.2 percent of images were
categorized under the human cost of war for Coalition soldiers frame for both
newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 5.0 percent of the images
were categorized human cost of war for Coalition soldiers with 0.0 percent in 2011. In
comparing the human cost of war frame between The New York Times and The Guardian,
there was a significant difference at the .000 level when including both years. When
isolating for 2006, the statistical difference is also at the .000 level. However, when
comparing only 2011 the difference no longer exists (there were no images of coalition
casualties in 2011). (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 17.1 and 17.2 in
Appendix I).

TABLE 18: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Human Cost of War for Coalition
Casualties Frame
hcostcoal17
Yes
Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

No
3
13
16

Total

Total
290
71
361

293
84
377

For the 377-picture sample, 10.1 percent of images were categorized under the human
cost of war for Iraqi casualties frame for both newspapers. When comparing the years
individually, in 2006, 10.9 percent of the images were categorized human cost of war for
Iraqi casualties with 5.4 percent in 2011. In comparing the human cost of war for Iraqi
casualties category between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was no
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statistical difference in the amount of images published between the two newspapers.
This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year.
(The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 18.1, 18.2, and 18.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 19: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Human Cost of War for Iraqi
Casualties Frame
hcostiraqi18
Yes
Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

Total

No
33
5
38

Total
260
79
339

293
84
377

Wounded disabled (Coalition soldiers or Iraqis): These photographs may contain
images of fresh injuries or fully healed injuries that result in disfigurement or
amputations. If the images are fresh and blood is visible, the images are also classified as
violence/destruction of war. Within the 377-picture sample, 2.9 percent of images were
categorized under the wounded disabled Coalition soldiers category for both newspapers.
When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 3.1 percent of the images were
categorized wounded disabled Coalition soldiers with 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing
the wounded disabled Coalition soldiers category between The New York Times and The
Guardian, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two
newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually
based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 19.1, 19.2, and 19.3 in
Appendix I).
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TABLE 20: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Wounded Coalition Soldiers Frame

Newspaper

woundcoal19
Yes
No
8
285
3
81
11
366

New York Times
The Guardian

Total

Total
293
84
377

TABLE 21: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Wounded Iraqis Frame
woundiraq20
Yes
Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

No
4
2
6

Total

Total
289
82
371

293
84
377

Of the 377-picture sample, 1.6 percent of images were categorized under the
wounded/disabled Iraqis category for both newspapers. When comparing the years
individually, in 2006, 1.9 percent of the images were categorized wounded/disabled
Iraqis with 0.0 percent in 2011. In comparing the wounded/disabled Iraqis category
between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was no statistical difference for
images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of
2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found
in Table 20.1 and 20.2 in Appendix I).

Anti-War Protest/ or anti- U.S. or U.K. public demonstration (Coalition or Arab
countries): These images include an individual or assembly of people either protesting
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against the Iraq War or against the intervention of the invading forces in Iraq. For the 377
total sample, 1.9 percent of images were categorized under the anti-war protest frame
from Arab countries for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in
2006, 1.9 percent of the images were categorized anti-war protest from Arab countries
with 0.0 percent in 2011. In comparing the anti-war protest frame from Arab countries
category between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was no statistical
difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when
comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete ChiSquare tests are found in Table 21.1 and 21.2 in Appendix I).

TABLE 22: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Anti-war Protest from Arab Countries
Frame
protestarab21
Yes
Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

No
5
2
7

Total

Total
288
82
370

293
84
377

Within the 377-picture sample, 0.3 percent of images were categorized under the antiwar protest frame from Coalition countries for both newspapers. When comparing the
years individually, in 2006, 0.3 percent of the images were categorized anti-war protest
from Coalition countries with 0.0 percent in 2011. In comparing the anti-war protest
frame from Coalition countries category between The New York Times and The
Guardian, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two
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newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually
based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 22.1 and 22.2 in
Appendix I).

TABLE 23: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Anti-war Protest from Coalition
Countries Frame

Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

Total

protestcoal22
Yes
No
1
292
0
84
1
376

Total
293
84
377

Celebrating an event associated to the Iraq War (Coalition or Arab countries) —
these images include an assembly of individuals cheering/celebrating an event associated
with the war. Of the 377-picture sample, 1.6 percent of images were categorized under
the celebrating an event associated to the Iraq War frame from Coalition countries for
both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 0.9 percent of the
images were categorized celebrating an event associated to the Iraq war from Coalition
countries with 5.4 percent in 2011. In comparing the celebrating an event associated to
the Iraq War frame from Coalition countries category between The New York Times and
The Guardian, there was a significant statistical difference at the .008 level in the amount
of images published between the two newspapers. However, when isolating for 2006 and
2011 this difference was no longer significant. Also, it is important to note how small the
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sample size is for this category. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 23.1,
23.2, and 23.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 24: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Celebrating an Event Associated with
the War from Coalition Countries
celebcoal23
Yes
Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

No
2
4
6

Total

Total
291
80
371

293
84
377

For the 377-picture sample, 1.1 percent of images were categorized under the celebrating
an event associated to the Iraq War frame from Arab countries for both newspapers.
When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 0.9 percent of the images were
categorized celebrating an event associated to the Iraq War frame from Arab countries
with 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing the celebrating an event associated to the Iraq
War frame from Arab countries category between The New York Times and The
Guardian, there was no statistical difference in the amount of images published between
the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and
individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 24.1, 24.2,
and 24.3 in Appendix I).
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TABLE 25: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Celebrating an Event Associated with
the War from Arab Countries
Celebarab24
Yes
Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

No
3
1
4

Total

Total
290
83
373

293
84
377

Human Interest Stories (Iraqi Civilians, Iraqi Military/Police, Coalition Soldiers,
Coalition Civilians): These images emphasize the human participants in the event. The
captions of these images include the name/s of the people depicted within the images,
which is also referenced within the articles that correspond to the images. Images are not
double coded as human interest and as Iraqi civilian, Iraqi police, or coalition military
troops. However, if there are other people in the background of an image that are not
referenced by name then these other categories can be included. Iraqi prisoners were not
included as human interest stories, often the prisoners are referenced by name within the
captions, but usually in terms of discussing the crime or the context surrounding the
imprisonment. Also, human cost of war was not included under human interest story.
However, if the image was of a grieving family member and included the name of the
family member grieving—it was coded for human cost of war for coalition casualties and
human interest story for coalition civilians.
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TABLE 26: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Human Interest Stories for Iraqi
Civilians Frame
Humiraqciv25
Yes
Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

No
19
0
19

Total

Total
274
84
358

293
84
377

Of the 377-picture sample, 5.0 percent of images were categorized under the human
interest stories for Iraqi civilians frame for both newspapers. When comparing the years
individually, in 2006, 4.7 percent of the images were categorized human-interest stories
for Iraqi civilians with 7.1 percent in 2011. In comparing the human-interest stories for
Iraqi civilians category between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was a
statistically significant difference at the .017 level in the amount of images published
between the two newspapers. The New York Times was much more likely to publish these
images over The Guardian. When isolating for 2006 this was significant at the .038 level,
however, was not longer significant when only looking at 2011. (The complete ChiSquare tests are found in Table 25.1, 25.2, and 25.3 in Appendix I).
Within the 377-picture sample, 0.3 percent of images were categorized under the
human-interest stories for Iraqi military for both newspapers. When comparing the years
individually, in 2006, 0.3 percent of the images were categorized human-interest stories
for Iraqi military with 0.0 percent in 2011. In comparing the human-interest stories for
Iraqi military category between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was no
statistical difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case
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when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete
Chi-Square tests are found in Table 26.1 and 26.2 in Appendix I).

TABLE 27: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Human Interest Stories for Iraqi
Military Frame
Humiraqmil26
Yes
Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

No
1
0
1

Total

Total
292
84
376

293
84
377

Of the 377-picture sample, 12.0 percent of images were categorized under the human
interest stories for Coalition military for both newspapers. When comparing the years
individually, in 2006, 3.4 percent of the images were categorized human-interest stories
for Coalition military with 10.7 percent in 2011. In comparing the human-interest stories
for Coalition military category between The New York Times and The Guardian, there
was no statistical difference in the amount of images published between the two
newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually
based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 27.1, 27.2, and 27.3 in
Appendix I).
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TABLE 28: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Human Interest Stories for Coalition
Soldiers Frame

Newspaper

Humcoalsol27
Yes
No
13
280
4
80
17
360

New York Times
The Guardian

Total

Total
293
84
377

Within the 377-picture sample, 3.2 percent of images were categorized under the humaninterest stories for Coalition civilians for both newspapers. When comparing the years
individually, in 2006, 3.7 percent of the images were categorized human-interest stories
for Coalition civilians with 0.0 percent in 2011. In comparing the human-interest stories
for Coalition civilians category between The New York Times and The Guardian, there
was no statistical difference in the amount of images published between the two
newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually
based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 28.1 and 28.2 in
Appendix I).

TABLE 29: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Human Interest Stories for Coalition
Civilians Frame
Humcoalciv28
Yes
Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

No
9
3
12

Total
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Total
284
81
365

293
84
377

Societal chaos of war, and/or bombings and insurgent activity – the captions of
these images mention bombings and/or insurgent activity, they may also refer to negative
consequences or aftermath that were a direct result of insurgent activity. For the 377picture sample, 11.7 percent of images were categorized under the societal chaos of war
for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 13.1 percent of the
images were categorized societal chaos of war with 3.6 percent in 2011. In comparing the
societal chaos of war category between The New York Times and The Guardian, there
was a significant statistical difference at the .025 level in the amount of images published
between the two newspapers. When isolating for 2006 the difference was significant at
the .043 level. The New York Times was much more likely to show images of societal
chaos of war frame than The Guardian. However, when isolating for 2011 the difference
was no longer significant. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 29.1, 29.2,
and 29.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 30: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Societal Chaos of War Frame
socichaos29
Yes
Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

No
40
4
44

Total

Total
253
80
333

293
84
377

Atrocities and/or scandals of war (committed by Coalition military, Saddam’s
regime, or the Iraqi government): These are clearly defined atrocities or scandals where
the headlines or captions define the actions as illegal, abuse, rape, and/or unnecessary

62	
  

torture. Often as a result, a trial or official investigation is or was underway within the
publication. Of the 377-picture sample, 2.9 percent of images were categorized under the
atrocities of war committed by Coalition military for both newspapers. When comparing
the years individually, in 2006, 1.9 percent of the images were categorized atrocities of
war committed by Coalition military with 8.9 percent in 2011. In comparing the
atrocities of war committed by Coalition military category between The New York Times
and The Guardian, there was no statistical difference for images published between the
two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and
individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 30.1, 30.2,
and 30.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 31: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Atrocities by Coalition Soldiers Frame
Atroccoalm30
Yes
Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

No
6
5
11

Total

Total
287
79
366

293
84
377

Within the 377-picture sample, 0.3 percent of images were categorized under the
atrocities of war committed by Saddam’s regime for both newspapers. When comparing
the years individually, in 2006, 0.3 percent of the images were categorized atrocities of
war committed by Saddam’s regime with 0.0 percent in 2011. In comparing the atrocities
of war committed by Saddam’s regime category between The New York Times and The
Guardian, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two
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newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually
based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 31.1 and 31.2 in
Appendix I).

TABLE 32: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Atrocities by Saddam’s Regime Frame
Atrocsadd31
Yes
Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

Total

No
1
0
1

Total
292
84
376

293
84
377

Of the 377-picture sample, 0.5 percent of images were categorized under the atrocities of
war committed by the Iraqi regime for both newspapers. When comparing the years
individually, in 2006, 0.3 percent of the images were categorized atrocities of war
committed by the Iraqi regime with 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing the atrocities of
war committed by the Iraqi regime category between The New York Times and The
Guardian, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two
newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually
based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 32.1, 32.2, and 32.3 in
Appendix I).
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TABLE 33: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Atrocities by Iraqi’s Regime Frame
atrociraq32
Yes
Newspaper

No

New York Times
The Guardian

Total

2
0
2

Total

291
84
375

293
84
377

Iraq Study Group: This war frame category was only included during the 2006
period. The Iraq study group refers to a panel of individuals selected to investigate the
progress and ongoing situation of the Iraq War, and make recommendations as to how the
future course of the involvement from the U.S. and U.K. For the 321-sample size for
2006, 3.1 percent of images were categorized under the Iraq study group for both
newspapers. In comparing the Iraq Study Group frame between The New York Times and
The Guardian, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two
newspapers for 2006. (The 2006 Chi-Square test is found in Table 33 in Appendix I).

TABLE 34: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Iraq Study Group Frame
iraqstudy33
Yes
Newspaper New York Times Count
% within
iraqstudy33
The Guardian
Count
% within
iraqstudy33
Total
Count
% within
iraqstudy33

65	
  

No

Total

9
90.0%

243
78.1%

252
78.5%

1
10.0%

68
21.9%

69
21.5%

10
100.0%

311
100.0%

321
100.0%

Coalition Troop Withdrawal: This category is only represented during the 2011
period during the troop withdrawal. These images include visual representations of
packing to leave Iraq, traveling out of Iraq, and arriving in the U.S. after leaving Iraq.
Within the 56-picture sample size for 2011, 25.0 percent of images were categorized
under the Coalition troop withdrawal for both newspapers. In comparing the Coalition
troop withdrawal frame between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was no
statistical difference in the amount of images published between the two newspapers for
2011. (The 2011 Chi-Square test is found in Table 34 in Appendix I).

TABLE 35: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Returning Coalition Soldiers Frame

Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

Total

Count
% within returncoal35
Count
% within returncoal35
Count
% within returncoal35

Returncoal35
Yes
No
11
30
78.6%
71.4%
3
12
21.4%
28.6%
14
42
100.0%
100.0%

Total
41
73.2%
15
26.8%
56
100.0%

Other: War frames that cannot be classified under any other category listed above
are coded as other. Of the 377-picture sample, 3.2 percent of images were categorized
under other for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 3.4
percent of the images were categorized other with 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing the
category other between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was no statistical
difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when
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comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete ChiSquare tests are found in Table 35.1, 35.2, and 35.3 in Appendix I).

TABLE 36: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Other Frame
other34
Yes
Newspaper

New York Times
The Guardian

Total

No
11
1
12

Total
282
83
365

293
84
377

H2: The Guardian will include more critical coverage of the Iraq War than The New York
Times in 2006 and 2011.
In answering H2, while the war frames varied on specific categories that can be
attributed to critical coverage of the war; i.e. human cost of war, wounded/disabled,
societal chaos of war, anti-war protests, violence/destruction of war, and atrocities of war,
one newspaper was not clearly more critical of the Iraq War than the other. However,
interesting statistical differences did arise in two of these category examples. In 2006, the
human cost of war frame for Coalition casualties was highly significant at the .000 level.
During this time, The Guardian was much more likely to publish images depicting the
loss of life of Coalition troops over The New York Times. Also, on the societal chaos of
war frame The New York Times was much more likely to publish images within this
frame over The Guardian at the .043 level in 2006. Interestingly, when comparing all the
2011 war frames of the two newspapers there were no statistical differences between the
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publications. Therefore, the results are mixed in answering H2, and one newspaper was
not found to be more critical than the other was.
RQ3: Did the war frames, and narratives change over time within each newspaper? If so
how?
The graphs below separate the 2006 top war frames from the 2011 data. The top five war
frames for 2006 were the following: Iraqi Civilians (20.6 percent); political Coalition
figures (19.6 percent); Coalition troops (13.7 percent); societal chaos of war (13.1
percent); and human cost of Iraqi casualties (10.9 percent). The five most representative
categories for 2011 were: returning Coalition soldiers (25 percent); Coalition troops (17.2
percent); political Coalition figures (14.3 percent); Iraqi civilians (14.3 percent); and
human interest stories of Coalition soldiers (10.7 percent).
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CHART 1: Top War Frames for 2006
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Iraqi Civilians

CHART 2: Top War Frames for 2011
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When comparing both newspapers together the war frames changed dramatically from
2006 to 2011. The 2006 coverage was much more critical with a higher frequency of
images depicting societal chaos of war, violence/destruction, and the human cost war for
Coalition soldiers and Iraqis. When isolating for newspaper, for societal chaos of war,
15.1 percent of The New York Times’ coverage fit into this category while only 5.8
percent of The Guardian’s 2006 coverage printed images of this frame (which was a
statistical difference at the .043 level). While there was not a statistical difference on
human cost of war for Iraqi civilians, this frame was more prominent in The New York
Times’ coverage (with 12.3 percent) than The Guardian’s coverage (with (5.8 percent).
Also, it is important to note, while combined the human cost of war frame for Coalition
casualties was 5.0 percent when including both newspapers, it represented 18.8 percent of
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all of The Guardian’s coverage for 2006. Interestingly in 2006 while The New York
Times focused on the loss of Iraqi civilian life (12.3 percent), The Guardian emphasized
the loss of Coalition soldiers (18.8 percent).
The majority of the coverage in 2011 in both newspapers revolved around the
Coalition troops with some coverage of political Coalition figures and Iraqi civilians.
However, none of the top five categories included critical war coverage. Therefore, the
prominent message was simply around the Coalition troops returning home.

H3: Both newspapers will include more frames depicting violence, destruction,
and societal chaos of war in 2006; and the 2011 coverage will focus on the
departing troops and include much less critical and graphic images of the war.
In answering H3, both newspapers did include in 2006 a larger number of critical frames
of violence, destruction, and the societal chaos from war, and provided a more sanitized
or uncritical conclusion of the Iraq war in 2011.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION

Revisiting the War Frames of Previous Scholarship
This study set out to investigate how war frames changed over a span of eight
years. In order to discuss how war frames changed it is important to revisit the findings of
previous studies. Previous research of the Iraq invasion period of 2003 has revealed that
military conflict was one of the most predominant war frames during the 2003 Iraq
invasion. King and Lester (2005) found the top five categories found in U.S. newspapers
for the 2003 Iraq invasion included: battlefield scenes, images of the home front, fighting
scenes, portraits, and images of civilians. Concluding that over half of the images could
be classified as battle images.
Griffin (2004) found about half of all images printed in news magazines were of
the arsenal, unengaged troops and political leaders. Keith, Schwalbe, and Silcock (2009)
analyzed print, television and online media coverage and found 77 percent of all images
were of the arsenal/war machine frame. Fahmy and Kim (2008) compared the visual
coverage of The New York Times and The Guardian during the Iraq invasion in 2003. The
New York Times’ top categories included: Coalition troops; Iraqi casualties; Coalition
political leaders; and Coalition troops with Iraqi civilians (Fahmy & Kim, 2008). The
Guardian’s most predominant categories were: Iraqi casualties; allied troops; and images
of looting (Fahmy & Kim, 2008). Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) compared the
websites of the New York Times and The Guardian during the 2003 Iraq invasion. The
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top five categories for The New York Times was: violence of war; military conflict;
rebuilding of Iraq; human interest; and prognostic frame (long term effects of war). For
The Guardian the most predominant frames were: violence of war; military conflict;
prognostic frame; rebuilding of Iraq; and anti-war protest (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern,
2007). Both websites had similar war frames but The Guardian focused more on anti-war
protests than The New York Times (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007). Overall,
military activity/conflict was the most dominant frame across the 2003 Iraq invasion
coverage. The visual representation of the 2003 Iraq invasion focused on the Coalition
troops, the Coalition political leaders, and the Coalition arsenal. The prominent narrative
was the progress towards Bagdad, which often erupted in violence and Iraqi casualties.

Frequency, Photograph Size, and Placement, 2006, 2011
The findings from this study revealed The New York Times was over three times
more likely to publish Iraq war images over The Guardian in 2006 and 2011 (77.7
percent compared to 22.3 percent). The United States deployed many more soldiers into
Iraq than the United Kingdom and had a larger stake in the Iraq War — therefore that
difference is representative in the media coverage for both countries.
Under the category of image size The Guardian was much more likely to publish
large images over The New York Times (19 percent compared to 3.4 percent). The
majority of images in both newspapers were medium or small with medium being the
predominant size photograph in both newspapers (55.3 percent of The New York Times
images and 42.9 percent of The Guardian images). This may be because the Iraq War had
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been going on for several years and therefore received less prominent placement in terms
of size compared to other news stories.
For photograph placement (the page the image was printed on in the publication),
there were no statistically significant differences on photograph placement. However, The
Guardian was slightly more likely to bury images of the Iraq War in the third section of
their newspaper over The New York Times. Again, with the ongoing and long duration of
the war, the Iraq War was no longer a new story. Updates of the Iraq War had to compete
with turmoil in the Afghanistan war in 2006 and the Arab Spring in the 2011 coverage.

The 2006 War Frames
Three years after the invasion period, Iraq was on the brink of a civil war. A new
permanent Iraqi government was in place, but it struggled against growing sectarian
violence and anti-coalition attacks. At the same time, the Iraq Study group found the
situation in Iraq to be deteriorating with no foreseeable end to the conflict and withdrawal
of Coalition forces would further destabilize the region.
The war frames that emerged in 2006 that were the same or similar to the 2003
studies were the following: diagnostic frame, political figures, military
conflict/developments, coalition troops, Iraqi military, Iraqi civilians, Iraqi
prisoners/prisons, rebuilding of Iraq, violence/destruction of war, human cost of war
(Coalition and Iraqi casualties), wounded (Coalition and Iraqis), protests (Coalition and
Arab countries), and human interest stories.
The diagnostic frame refers to images that represent the reasons for leading to
war, including images of enemies and/or enemy weapons. From Dimitrova and Connolly-
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Ahern’s (2007) study 1.8 percent of images from both newspapers were labeled
diagnostic. Fahmy and Kim (2008) found only 1.2 percent of the images collected from
The Guardian and The New York Times to be images of Saddam. The amount of images
in the diagnostic frame for this study in 2006 more than tripled from earlier studies with
6.9 percent of all the images categorized as diagnostic, 6.3 percent from The New York
Times and 8.7 percent from The Guardian. When comparing The New York Times and
The Guardian, there were no statistically significant differences of published images
between these newspapers. The majority of images in this category were of Saddam
Hussein. At the end of 2006, the new Iraqi government found Saddam Hussein guilty of
crimes against humanity after a yearlong trial in an Iraqi court. Saddam’s trial was highly
publicized and the majority of these images were of Saddam during the trial and
referencing war crimes that occurred decades before the Iraq invasion. The widely
publicized trial is probably why these images increased from 2003 to 2006.
Political figures from Coalition countries and Arab countries were classified for
this study, including presidents, prime ministers, cabinet members, member of congress,
high-ranking military officials, and other public officials (but do not include images of
Saddam or other individuals clearly defined as enemies). From Fahmy and Kim’s (2008)
study of the Iraq invasion in 2003, 9.1 percent of images were of political and military
leaders of Coalition forces from both newspapers. In comparing their study to this
research that number doubles in 2006 with 19.6 percent of the images categorized as
political Coalition figures. The majority of political Coalition figures were of the U.S.
president or the British prime minister for this study. There were no statistical differences
in comparing The New York Times and The Guardian in 2006 on the category of political
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Coalition figures. Fahmy and Kim’s (2008) study found 0.7 percent of political and
military Arab figures represented in 2003. In comparing 2003 to this study for 2006,
political Arab figures increased in 2006 to 5.6 percent of the coverage in both
newspapers. However, when isolating for publication for this study for 2006, there was a
significant difference in the 2006 representation of this category. The New York Times
was much more likely to publish images of political Arab figures over The Guardian,
with 7.1 percent of The New York Times’ coverage was of political Arab figures, whereas
The Guardian did not publish any images under this category in 2006.
Military activity/developments may include Coalition patrols, withdrawal, or
change of military bases as well as military conflict (but does not include the 2011
withdrawal). For Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern’s (2007) study in 2003, 75.4 percent of
images collected were of military conflict. In comparing their study to this research, this
number dropped dramatically in 2006, with 8.4 percent of the images categorized under
military activity/developments. In comparing this frame between the two newspapers for
this study in 2006, there were no statistically significant differences between the amounts
of images published.
Coalition military troops are a visual presence of Coalition soldiers and are not
already classified under wounded Coalition soldiers, human cost of war, or atrocities.
From Fahmy and Kim’s (2008) study of 2003, 21.8 percent of images collected were of
Coalition troops. In comparing their research the amount of images of Coalition troops
decreases in 2006, with 13.7 percent of the images were categorized under Coalition
military troops. When comparing The New York Times and The Guardian in 2006 for this
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study there were no statistical differences for images published between the two
newspapers.
Under the category Iraqi police/military this denotes a visual presence of Iraqi
police/military that are not already classified as human interest stories. From Fahmy and
Kim’s (2008) study Iraqi military and police consisted of 1.4 percent of the images in
2003. In comparing their study to this research, this number increases in 2006, with 4.0
percent of the images classified under this category. In comparing Iraqi police/military
between the two newspapers in 2006, there were no statistical differences in their visual
representation.
For the category of Iraqi civilians, this includes images of Iraqi civilians not
already classified under human-interest stories, anti-war protest, or cheering/celebrating
an event associated with the war. Fahmy and Kim’s (2008) category of “civilian life” in
2003 was used for comparison with this study’s category of Iraqi civilians. In their 2003
study of the Iraq invasion 21.0 percent of the images were of civilian life. This amount
was similar to this study for 2006, where 20.6 percent of the images were categorized
under Iraqi civilians. When comparing The New York Times and The Guardian in 2006
there was a significant statistical difference between the two newspapers. The New York
Times was over twice as likely to publish images of Iraqi civilians over The Guardian.
23.4 percent of The New York Times’ coverage was of the Iraqi civilians category over
10.1 percent of The Guardian’s coverage.
The category of Iraqi prisoners/prisons does not include images of Saddam, and is
a visual representation of Iraqi prisoners/prisons. From Fahmy and Kim’s (2008) study
2.3 percent of images were of Iraqi prisoners. This is similar to the amount of images
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found in 2006, only 2.8 percent of the images were categorized under this Iraqi
prisoners/prisons category, and there were no statistical differences between The New
York Times and The Guardian.
The rebuilding of Iraq frame shows how Coalition forces or Iraqis are involved in
rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure through roads, bridges, or other facilities. For Dimitrova
and Connolly-Ahern’s (2007) study in 2003, 61.4 percent of the images collected were of
the rebuilding of Iraq frame. In comparing their study to this study in 2006, this amount
dropped considerably to only 0.3 percent of all images being under this category. Only
one image in 2006 was included in this category and was printed by The Guardian. With
the small amount of images, there were no statistical differences between both
newspapers for 2006.
For the violence/destruction of war frame, these images may include fire, bullets,
violence, visible bloodshed, and/or destruction of buildings or infrastructure. For
Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern’s (2007) study in 2003, 89.5 percent of images were
classified as violence of war. In comparing their study, the amount of violent images
dropped dramatically in 2006, with 9.7 percent of the images categorized under
violence/destruction of war. When comparing both newspapers in 2006 there were no
statistical differences between the amounts of images published between the two
newspapers.
The human cost of war frame includes images of Coalition soldiers or Iraqis.
These images represent loss of life, which may be depicted through coffins, gravesites,
military photographs of the deceased thorough portraits, and visible grieving family or
loved ones. From Fahmy and Kim’s (2008) study in 2003, 2.0 percent of images were of
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Coalition military casualties. In comparing their study to this research in 2006 that
amount increased to 5.0 percent of the images classified under human cost of war for
Coalition soldiers. There was a statistical significant difference between both newspapers
in 2006 for the human cost of war frame for Coalition soldiers. The Guardian was much
more likely to publish images of the human cost of war frame for Coalition soldiers over
The New York Times. In 2006, only 1.2 percent of all images for The New York Times
were included under this category whereas 18.8 percent of The Guardian’s coverage for
2006 was included in this war frame. From Fahmy and Kim’s (2008) study in 2003, 3.0
percent of images were of Iraqi casualties. In comparing their study to this research in
2006, the amount of images classified as human cost of war for Iraqis tripled to 10.9
percent of images for both newspapers. When comparing the amount of images in both
newspapers in 2006 for human cost of war for Iraqis there were no statistical differences
between the publications.
The anti-war protest/anti- U.S. or U.K. demonstration (Coalition or Arab
countries) includes images of one or more individuals protesting against the Iraq War or
against the intervention of the invading forces. From Fahmy and Kim’s (2008) study in
2003, 2.4 percent of images were of anti-war protests in Arab/Muslim nations. This
amount slightly decreases in this study for 2006 with 1.9 percent of the images
categorized as anti-war protest from Arab countries. When comparing The New York
Times and The Guardian in 2006 there were no statistically significant differences for
images published under this category. From Fahmy and Kim’s (2008) study in 2003, 2.3
percent of images were of anti-war protests in the U.S. or U.K. This number drops even
more in this study of 2006 with 0.3 percent for 2006 of anti-war protests in Coalition
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countries. Only one image was printed in 2006 and it was in The New York Times
newspaper. The sample size for this category was small and there were no statistically
significant differences between The New York Times and The Guardian for the anti-war
protest war frame.
The category of human-interest stories differentiated between Iraqi civilians, Iraqi
military/police, Coalition soldiers, and Coalition civilians. These images emphasize the
human participants in the event and include the names of these individuals in the captions
or identified within the story and their personal experience is a major part of the
newspaper article. From Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern’s (2007) study in 2003, 57.9
percent of images were categorized as human interest, however, whether the human
interest story was about Coalition soldiers, Coalition civilians, Iraqi soldiers, or Iraqi
civilians was not differentiated within their study. For this study in 2006, the total of
human-interest stories of all categories amounts to 12.1 percent of all images. In 2006,
4.7 percent of the images published were of human-interest stories for Iraqi civilians. In
comparing The New York Times and The Guardian, there was a statistically significant
difference in the amounts of images published within this category in 2006. The New
York Times was six times more likely to publish human-interest story images of Iraqi
civilians over The Guardian. In 2006, The New York Times published 6.0 percent of
human-interest stories of Iraqi civilians, while The Guardian did not publish any images
within this category. For human-interest stories of Iraqi police/military, only 0.3 percent
of images were classified under this category. Only one image was printed within this
category in 2006 and it was published in The New York Times. With such a small sample
size for this category, there were no statistically significant differences for human-interest
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stories for Iraqi military/police. In 2006, 3.4 percent of the images were categorized as
human-interest stories for Coalition military for both newspapers. When comparing both
newspapers for 2006 there were not statistically significant differences in the amount of
human-interest stories published for Coalition military. In 2006, 3.7 percent of the images
in both newspapers were of human interest stories for Coalition civilians. In comparing
both newspapers there were no statistically significant differences for images published
in 2006 under human-interest stories for Coalition civilians. Overall, The New York Times
was more likely to publish human interest stories for all categories over The Guardian in
2006, 13.9 percent of all The New York Times’ images were of human-interest stories,
while only 5.8 percent of The Guardian’s coverage was of this category.
The types of frames that emerged in 2006 that were distinctive from 2003 were
the following: Saddam’s trial, Donald Rumsfeld exiting as Defense Secretary, celebrating
an event associated with the war, societal chaos of war, atrocities, and/or scandals of war,
wounded/disabled frame, and the Iraqi study group.
In 2006 Saddam’s trial was highly publicized, the images in this category include
images associated to the trial but do not include images of Saddam. These images often
included visuals of the courtroom and the judge. In 2006, only 1.9 percent of the images
published were included within this category. When comparing The New York Times and
The Guardian there were no statistically significant differences for images published.
Also, in 2006 Donald Rumsfeld lost political support as the Iraq War continued
and he resigned at the end of 2006, therefore the category of Donald Rumsfeld’s exiting
as Defense Secretary was added. These images were separated from the images of
political Coalition figures because his resignation signaled a change in how the war
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would be handled. In 2006, 3.7 percent of images were classified under this category.
When comparing The New York Times and The Guardian there were no statistically
significant differences for images published in this category between the two newspapers.
Celebrating an event associated with the Iraq War (Coalition or Arab countries)
include images cheering a development in the war. In 2006, 0.9 percent of images were
categorized as celebrating an event associated with the war by Coalition Countries.
Interestingly, for celebrating an event associated with the Iraq War for Arab countries it
is also 0.9 percent in 2006. When isolating for 2006 only, there were no statistically
significant differences in the types of images published for celebrating an event
associated with the war by Coalition or Arab countries. In 2006, the most celebrated
event associated with the war was the verdict from Saddam’s trial where he was
sentenced to death by hanging.
The category of societal chaos of war, and/or bombings and insurgent activity was
another new frame that emerged in 2006. In 2006, 13.1 percent of images were classified
under the societal chaos of war frame for both newspapers. In comparing the
publications, there was a significant statistical difference between The New York Times
and The Guardian. The New York Times was much more likely to publish images of the
societal chaos of war frame over The Guardian. In 2006, 15.1 percent of the New York
Times’ images were of this war frame compared to 5.8 percent of The Guardian’s
coverage.
Atrocities and/or scandals of war were separated by Coalition military, Saddam’s
regime, and the Iraqi government. These were actions defined as illegal, abuse, rape,
and/or unnecessary torture. In 2006, 1.9 percent of the images were categorized as
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atrocities of war committed by Coalition soldiers. Only 0.3 percent of images in 2006
were classified under atrocities of war committed by Saddam’s regime. Also, in 2006 0.3
percent of images were categorized as atrocities of war committed by the Iraqi regime.
For the atrocities categories, no statistically significant differences for images published
by The New York Times compared to The Guardian.
The wounded/disabled war frame distinguishes between Coalition soldiers and
Iraqis, these photographs may contain images of fresh wounds or fully healed injuries
that have resulted in disfigurement or amputations. In 2006, 3.1 percent of the images
were classified as wounded/disabled Coalition soldiers for both newspapers. When
comparing The New York Times and The Guardian, no statistically significant differences
existed between the images represented in this category. For wounded/disabled Iraqis,
there were 1.9 percent of images included in this category in 2006. When comparing both
newspapers for wounded/disabled Iraqis, there were no statistically significant
differences between the amounts of images published.
The Iraq study group frame was also a new category that emerged in 2006, this
frame refers to a panel of individuals selected to examine the progress and ongoing
situation of the Iraq War and to make recommendations on a future course of action. In
2006, 3.1 percent of images were classified under this frame. When comparing The New
York Times and The Guardian, there were no statistically significant differences between
the amounts of images published.
The findings for this study discovered the top five war frames for 2006 for both
newspapers were the following: Iraqi Civilians (20.6 percent); political Coalition figures
(19.6 percent); Coalition troops (13.7 percent); societal chaos of war (13.1 percent); and
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human cost of Iraqi casualties (10.9 percent). When isolating for The New York Times
and The Guardian by year, there were some variation in the top war frames. For The New
York Times in 2006 the top five war frames were: Iraqi civilians (23.4 percent); political
Coalition figures (18.7 percent); societal chaos of war (15.1 percent); coalition troops
(13.9 percent); and human cost of war for Iraqi casualties (12.3 percent). For The
Guardian in 2006 the top five categories were: political coalition figures (23.2 percent);
human cost of war for Coalition casualties (18.8 percent); Coalition troops (13.0 percent);
Iraqi civilians (10.1 percent); and with diagnostic and violence/destruction of war both at
8.7 percent.
While the 2003 invasion period has been described as the unstoppable war
machine rolling into Baghdad (Griffin, 2004), the 2006 occupation period lacked a
central theme or specific narrative. Instead, with the rising death and wounded rates of
Iraqi civilians and Coalition solders along with rise of insurgent activities and bombings
the 2006 period can best be described as chaotic and violent. With the exiting of Donald
Rumsfeld as Defense Secretary and the emergence of the Iraq study group the future
direction of the war is unclear and criticized. How the Iraq War had been handled is
largely questioned at this time from U.S. and U.K. media in 2006. This was also reflected
in the American public’s opinion over the war. By mid-November 2006, only 41 percent
of Americans believed going to war in Iraq was the right decision and over 51 percent
believing it was the wrong decision (Pew Research Center, 2013). In the U.K. in March
2006, 33 percent of the British people believed going to Iraq was the right decision over
57 percent believing it was the wrong decision (YouGov, 2013). However, amid the large
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increase in insurgent activity and casualty rates at the end of 2006 — the only clear
message is that the Iraq War is too unstable for the Coalition troops to withdrawal.

The 2011 War Frames
Only one war frame emerged in 2011 that was distinctive from 2006, this was the
coalition troop withdraw frame. These images include packing to leave Iraq, traveling out
of Iraq, and arriving in the U.S. after leaving Iraq. In 2011, 25.0 percent of all images in
both newspapers were of this frame. When comparing The New York Times and The
Guardian for all of the war frames there were no statistically significant differences for
images published between both newspapers. The types of frames that disappeared in the
2011 coverage from the 2006 coverage were the following: Saddam’s trial; Rumsfeld
exiting as Defense Secretary; human cost of war for Coalition casualties; wounded Iraqis;
anti-war protests from Arab countries; anti-war protests from Coalition countries; humaninterest stories of Iraq military; human-interest stories of Coalition civilians; and
atrocities by Saddam’s regime.
Several war frames decreased from 2006 to 2011 as the visual coverage during
this time became centralized around the departing Coalition soldiers. These frames
included, the diagnostic frame, political coalition figures, military activity/developments,
Iraqi civilians, violence/destruction of war, human cost of war for Iraqi casualties,
wounded/disabled Coalition soldiers, and the societal chaos of war frame.
For the diagnostic frame in 2011, there was one image of Saddam printed by The
Guardian. This represented 1.8 percent of the 56-sample size for the images collected in
2011. The diagnostic frame had decreased considerably as compared to 2006 when it was
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6.9 percent. In 2011 images of political Coalition figures was still a prominent frame at
14.3 percent of the images from both newspapers. This had decreased a few percentage
points from 2006 when the percentage of political Coalition figures was at 19.6 percent.
For the military activity/development frame in 2011, 5.4 percent of images published
were coded under this frame. The military activity frame decreased a few percentage
points from 8.4 percent in 2006 to 5.4 percent in 2011. The visual representation of Iraqi
civilians declined in 2011, but was still a major war category. In 2006, 20.6 percent of
images were classified as Iraqi civilians compared to 14.3 percent in 2011. The
violence/destruction of war frame decreased in 2011. In 2006, 9.7 percent of images were
classified under violence/destruction of war, compared to only 1.8 percent in 2011.
The human cost of war for Iraqi casualties frame decreased in 2011. In 2006, 10.9
percent of images were categorized under human cost of war for Iraqi casualties
compared to 5.4 in 2011. The amount of wounded/disabled Coalition soldiers decreased
in 2011. In 2006, 3.1 percent of images were categorized as wounded/disabled Coalition
soldiers compared to 1.8 percent in 2011. Images classified under societal chaos of war,
and/or bombings and insurgent activity frame dropped considerably from 2006 to 2011.
In 2006, 13.1 percent of images were categorized as societal chaos of war, compared to
3.6 percent in 2011.
While many war frames disappeared or declined from 2006 to 2011, there were
some that increased. These included: political Arab figures; Coalition military troops;
Iraqi police/military; rebuilding of Iraq frame; celebrating an event associated with the
war; human interest stories for Iraqi civilians; human interest stories for Coalition
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military; atrocities committed by Coalition soldiers; and atrocities committed by the Iraqi
regime.
For political Arab figures in 2011, 8.9 percent of the images were included in this
category. The percentage of political Arab figures rose from 2006 with 5.6 percent of the
images to 8.9 percent. Also, while in 2006 The Guardian did not publish any images in
this category, in 2011 it represented 13.3 percent of the images relating to the Iraq War.
The Coalition military troops frame more than doubled in 2011. The Coalition military
troops frame was a very prominent frame in 2006 at 13.7 percent of images then
increased considerably to 37.5 percent of the images collected in 2011. The Iraqi
police/military frame rose slightly in 2011, from 4.0 percent in 2006 to 5.4 percent. For
the category of Iraqi prisoners/prisons this war frame rose in 2011. In 2006, 2.8 percent
of images were classified as Iraqi prisoners/prisons and increased to 8.9 percent in 2011.
The rebuilding of Iraq frame increased slightly in 2011. In 2006, only 0.3 percent of
images were classified under this category compared to 1.8 percent in 2011.
Celebrating an event associated with the war by Coalition and Arab countries both
rose in 2011. In 2006, 0.9 percent of images were categorized under celebrating an event
associated with the war by Coalition countries compared to 5.4 percent in 2011. Also, in
2006, 0.9 percent of images were classified as celebrating an event associated with the
war from Arab countries compared to 1.8 percent in 2011. In both categories, the event
being celebrated was the withdrawal of Coalition soldiers from Iraq.
Under the category of human-interest stories for Iraqi civilians, the percentage of
images published rose from 2006 to 2011. In 2006, 4.7 percent of images were classified
under human-interest stories for Iraqi civilians compared to 7.1 percent in 2011. The
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percent of human-interest stories for Coalition military rose from 2006 to 2011. In 2006,
3.4 percent of images were classified as human interest stories for Coalition military
compared to 10.7 percent in 2011.
For the category of atrocities and/or scandals of war committed by Coalition
soldiers the percentage of these images rose in 2011. In 2006, 1.9 percent of images were
classified as atrocities and/or scandals of war committed by Coalition soldiers compared
to 8.9 percent in 2011. For the category of atrocities and/or scandals of war committed by
the Iraqi regime, the percentage of these images rose slightly from 2006 to 2011. In 2006,
0.3 percent of the images were classified as atrocities and/or scandals of war compared to
1.8 percent in 2011.
The five most representative categories for 2011 for both newspapers were:
returning Coalition soldiers (25 percent); Coalition troops (17.2 percent); political
Coalition figures (14.3 percent); Iraqi civilians (14.3 percent); and human interest stories
of Coalition soldiers (10.7 percent). The top five categories for 2011 for The New York
Times was: Coalition troops (36.6 percent); returning Coalition soldiers (26.8 percent);
political Coalition figures (17.1 percent); Iraqi civilians (14.6 percent); and human
interest stories of Iraqi civilians (9.8 percent). For The Guardian for 2011 the top
categories were: Coalition troops (40.0 percent); human interest stories of Coalition
military (20.0 percent); atrocities by Coalition Soldiers (20.0 percent); and returning
Coalition soldiers (20.0 percent). Then following categories were all at 13.3 percent for
The Guardian in 2011: political Arab figures, military conflict/developments, Iraqi
civilians, Iraqi prisoners/prisons, and celebrating Coalition countries.
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The central narrative around the 2011 coverage was the departure of Coalition
soldiers and the long awaited official end to the conflict. The primary focus was of the
Coalition troops and their personal stories and preparation in leaving Iraq. During this
time, more emphasis was put on the representation of political Arab figures and the Iraqi
military/police in maintaining control in Iraq. Also, images of Iraqi civilians transitioning
to normal life and celebrating the end of the Iraq war were represented in both
publications. During this time both The New York Times and The Guardian published
stories about continued insurgent activity and bombings resulting in death and
destruction, however, photographs rarely accompanied these articles.
During the last month leading up to the withdrawal of Coalition troops in Iraq,
public approval of the war slightly increased to 48 percent believing it was the right
decision, with more than 46 percent believing it was the wrong decision (Pew Research
Center, 2013). For the U.K., 2011 public opinion data was not available, however by
2013, only 27 percent of the British public believed going to war was the right decision
(YouGov, 2013).
In comparing the war frames, it was expected for the representation of military
activity/development to dramatically decrease from 2003 to 2006 and 2011. However, it
was surprising that the rebuilding of Iraq frame was much more significant in 2003 over
2006 and 2011. In addition, when the rebuilding of Iraq frame appeared in the research, it
was often connected with a misuse of funds and associated with unsuccessful projects in
Iraq.
Interesting war frames that emerged in 2006 included the Iraq study group and
societal chaos of war. The 2003 narrative that emphasized the progress the Coalition
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forces made no longer existed in 2006. The new focus in 2006 was how badly the Iraq
War had been handled and the instability of the war at that time. Also, since Iraq was so
unstable with widespread insurgent activity, the one clear message was that the Coalition
forces could not abandon Iraq during this time. Therefore, while the former actions of the
Bush administration were questioned and criticized, the continual presence of the
Coalition forces within the country was a necessity.

Discussion
During the invasion period, both The New York Times and The Guardian focused
heavily on the Coalition military activity, the search for weapons, and the successes of
securing Iraqi cities including Baghdad. This research investigated how the press visually
represented an unpopular and largely controversial war in the U.S. and British presses.
While both The New York Times and The Guardian visually portrayed the end of the
2011 conflict similarly, the tumultuous 2006 period was represented differently in both
newspapers. After the Coalition forces did not find weapons of mass destruction, which
were believed to pose a threat to the allied nations (and was the primary reason for
invading Iraq), media coverage surrounding the military action in Iraq became largely
criticized. Three years after the invasion period, Iraq was on the brink of a civil war. The
situation in Iraq had largely deteriorated with widespread insurgent activity and Iraqi
civilian deaths — the end of the war was nowhere in sight because withdrawal of
Coalition forces would further destabilize the region. Eight years after the Iraq War began
Coalition forces withdrew from Iraq, while insurgent activity still existed — the new
Iraqi government was more secure.
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Over a decade after the war in Iraq began, the American and British public is still
divided over the decision to use military force in that country. The Pew Research center
tracked the American public’s opinion over whether using military force in Iraq was the
right or wrong decision from 2003 until 2013. At the start of the Iraq War in mid-March,
71 percent of Americans believed using military force was the right decision, by the end
of the official invasion period this number had dropped slightly to 69 percent (Pew
Research Center, 2013). In the U.K. only 50 percent believed going to war was the right
decision in March of 2003, with that slightly increasing to 54 percent by early April of
2003 (YouGov, 2013). A decade after the war began 41 percent of Americans believe
going to war with Iraq was the right decision, 44 percent believe it was the wrong
decision, and 14 percent responded that they did not know (or refused to answer). By
2013, only 27 percent of the British people believed going to war with Iraq was the right
decision over 53 percent believing it was the wrong decision (and 20 percent responded
they did not know) (YouGov, 2013). Surprisingly in 2013, more American and British
respondents were undecided over whether going to war was the right decision or not over
all other years polled (Pew Research Center, 2013; YouGov, 2013). To a large extent this
dis-enthrallment with U.S. and U.K. objectives can be attributed to the coverage of the
war from the respective nation’s media.
Analyzing visual images of recent wars therefore is an important area of study in
understanding complex relationships between media, political administrations, and the
public’s knowledge of war. In the United States, the Persian Gulf War is generally cited
as the Pentagon’s response to the media coverage of the Vietnam War. Danny Schechter,
a U.S. based filmmaker and former TV network producer and journalist has been
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outspoken in his criticisms of domestic media to hold U.S. officials accountable for the
failures of the Iraq War. Schechter argues that many in the Pentagon believe the media
coverage of the Vietnam War ultimately led to the loss of that war (Schechter, 2011).
Therefore, as a result, “large amounts of money and manpower” have been invested in
influencing the press in order to mitigate negative media coverage of wars after Vietnam
(Schechter, 2011, p. 313).
Rachel Maddow, an American television host, political commentator, and author,
addressed war censorship and its affects as “insulating the public from not only the cost
of war but sometimes even the knowledge that it’s happening — war making has become
almost an autonomous function of the American state” (Maddow, 2012, pp. 202-203).
The Bush administration from 2003 to 2008 “exercised a tight hold on imagery about the
cost of the wars” news photographers were banned from the transfer ceremonies for flagdraped caskets and the president and vice president did not attend military funerals
(Maddow, 2012, pp. 245). The government actively prevented funeral coverage even
when reporters were invited by the families, also by requiring news agencies to get
signed consent forms from photographed wounded soldiers — the Pentagon further
limited the press (Maddow, 2012). Under President Obama’s administration from 2008 to
present, Obama has taken a more aggressive stance on preventing whistleblowers since
the Nixon administration (McVeigh, 2013). Prosecuting journalists under the Espionage
Act has severely hindered the release of information and led to a chilling effect on the
press (McVeigh, 2013). Therefore, media coverage of current wars is affected by even
more restrictive measures than under the Bush administration.
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In addition, with continued media consolidation of news organizations and the
corporatization of TV news these changes have made “external manipulation easier”
(Schechter, 2011, p. 314). Schechter (2011) has argued that the war was not the product
of only one person — “it took powerful institutions — a military-industrial-media
complex — to achieve the desired outcome” (Schechter, 2011, p. 314). Fuchs (2011)
discusses how the competition for Iraq War coverage in 2003 between major channels as
FOX, CNN, ABC, CBS, and MSNBC “did not automatically result in a more democratic
and pluralistic type of coverage” but instead resulted in “mass one-dimensional
coverage” (Fuchs, 2011, p. 57).
The Iraq invasion has been described as a conflict reduced to “a fight between the
evil-doer Saddam Hussein and the forces of civilization” (Schechter, 2011, p. 308). After
the invasion of Iraq, American viewers began to seek alternative sources in other
countries including the BBC and British newspaper websites (Schechter, 2011). The
Guardian as well as the Independent, and the Daily Mirror “offered a counter-narrative
no mainstream media outlet did the same” (Schechter, 2011, p. 307). Dahr Jamail a wellknown journalist that reported from Iraq discussed how the reporting of the The New
York Times represented the trend of the entire mainstream media (Jamail, 2011, p. 292).
Therefore, analyzing The Guardian and The New York Times following the Iraq invasion
period is an important area of study and comparison.
Another important aspect of the Iraq War was the use of embedded reporters, who
first gained notoriety as war correspondents in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. While
embedded journalists in 2003 were subject to less restrictive practices than those in 1991
were, many scholars have argued because the embedded reporters are so dependent on
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the soldiers for safety, they would be more likely to identify with them and report stories
that are more favorable about the soldiers and the war (King & Lester, 2005). King and
Lester (2005) found similar visual war frames between the 1991 Persian Gulf and 2003
Iraq War.
Scholars have argued that embedded journalism is an “integrative strategy of
media self-censorship” which dissolves the distance between reporter and military
(Fuchs, 2011, p. 56). During the Iraq War embed program, more than 600 reporters were
stationed with British and U.S. troops from the front and had to sign an agreement
defining “ground rules,” which set strict regulations for coverage (Fuchs, 2011, p. 56).
For example, an embedded journalist was fired for posting images of the remains of
American soldiers after a suicide bombing (Jamail, 2011).
While a small percentage of all images collected in 2006 and 2011 were of
atrocities or scandals by Coalition soldiers (2.9 percent), Jamail (2011) an Iraq War
reporter argues this number could have been much larger. Jamail (2011) discussed how
there was a misrepresentation of news by journalists during Fallujah, and Abu Hanifa:
I have found and reported that in order to bring freedom to Fallujah, the “US
troops have sprayed chemical and nerve gases on resistance fighters” and that
“residents have been further burnt beyond treatment by poisonous gases.” I had
evidence too since the US had admitted having used napalm, an internationally
banned weapon, in Iraq during the initial invasion of the country. I had eyewitness
accounts to back my claims. (Jamail, 2011, p. 294)
Jamail (2011) reported that some of these illegal weapons used by the U.S. accidentally
killed American soldiers, and argues “a few simple interviews conducted with Iraqis and
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some readily available photographs and video can drastically correct the glaring errors in
the Western media’s representations of the occupation” (p. 300). Within crisis
management, there are five most commonly used propaganda tactics, which include:
“delay, distract, discredit, spotlight, and scapegoat” which have been largely used by the
United States in their media coverage of the Iraq War (Jamail, 2011, p. 300).
There were a number of limitations of the study. First, when utilizing microfilm to
analyze images, the image quality is deteriorated from the original form. The images are
in black and white instead of color, and several of the microfilm images were dark and
fine image details were lost. The largest obstacle this study faced involved ensuring intercoder reliability that becomes more difficult when latent content is coded. Examples of
manifest conflict would be images of Coalition soldiers or Iraqi civilians, while latent
content is less explicit like violence/destruction and societal chaos of war. Also, it was
anticipated that coding reliability might become difficult because some photographs may
be in more than one war frame, and the intercoder may not be as diligent in ensuring that
all frames are coded. However, with pilot coding training and testing — this study
worked to mitigate those problems.
Initially this study intended to classify images of children in the Iraq War
coverage. Often images of children become persuasive messages either supporting or
criticizing the war efforts. Thorne (2003) explained the nature of these images and how
they “personify injustice” because “children signify vulnerability, dependence and
innocence” (p. 261). However, with only a few images collected from both newspapers,
this category was not utilized within the study.
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After conducting the study, images of the human cost of war would be a ripe area
for future research. Within this study, there were several ways how the loss of life of
Coalition soldiers and Iraqis were portrayed. The human cost of war for Coalition
casualties was most often represented by portrait images of the deceased soldiers, with
some flag draped caskets. Conversely, the images of human cost of war for the Iraqis
were much more graphic, with the most common representation of bodies covered by a
sheet of cloth—and sometimes with an arm or other body part visible.
As we enter a new era of long-standing wars, analyzing ongoing conflict is a very
important area for future research. This study found there are major differences between
media coverage of invasion periods over continuing conflict. Whether going to war with
Iraq was the right decision is still a largely debated topic by the American and British
public. This is largely reflective in how the media coverage of The New York Times and
The Guardian evolved over time. However, there were major differences in how these
newspapers covered the 2006 occupation period in terms of political Arab figures, Iraqi
civilians, human cost of war of Coalition soldiers, and human-interest stories about Iraqi
civilians, and societal chaos of war. In comparison to The Guardian in 2006, The New
York Times underrepresented the amount of Coalition military deaths, and instead
focused on political Arab figures within the new Iraqi government and the plight of the
Iraqi civilians during this period of widespread insurgent activity resulting in massive
Iraqi casualties. Over a decade after the Iraq War began, more American and British
people are undecided over whether using military force was the right decision.
Historically, the public should be more informed about the facts and issues surrounding
military conflict and more decisive as further details are revealed over time through
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media outlets. This suggests a failure by the U.S. and U.K. media in providing a
comprehensive representation of the Iraq War to allow individuals to come to definitive
decisions about the actions of their elected officials in dealing with foreign policy. What
the Iraq War should have taught us is that a critical investigative press is essential in
preventing misrepresented and unnecessary wars. However, with shrinking media
budgets for investigative reporting, and stricter government control over what the press
can release — this lesson will not be learned in the foreseeable future.
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APPENDIX I
Chi-Square Tests
Table 1: Newspapers according to publication year

Value
.771a
.495
.743

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.380
.482
.389

df
1
1
1

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.387
Linear-by-Linear
.769
1
.381
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.48.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.237

Table 2: Photograph size published and newspaper
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
25.226a
2
.000
Likelihood Ratio
20.623
2
.000
Linear-by-Linear Association
6.394
1
.011
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.79.

Table 3: Newspaper and page images of the Iraq War were published
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
2.710a
2
.258
Likelihood Ratio
2.674
2
.263
Linear-by-Linear Association
2.262
1
.133
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.24.

Table 4: Photograph placement and size
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
9.925a
4
.042
Likelihood Ratio
12.418
4
.014
Linear-by-Linear Association
.966
1
.326
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 1 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.55.
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Table 5.1: Newspaper and diagnostic frame, 2006 and 2011

Value
.940a
.506
.877

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.332
.477
.349

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.312
Linear-by-Linear
.938
1
.333
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.12.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.232

Table 5.2: Newspaper and diagnostic frame for 2006

Value
.467a
.172
.443

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.494
.678
.506

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.590
Linear-by-Linear
.466
1
.495
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.73.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.326

Table 5.3: Diagnostic frame for 2011

Value
2.783a
.280
2.685

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.095
.597
.101

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.268
Linear-by-Linear
2.733
1
.098
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.268

Table 6: Saddam trial frame for 2006

Value
1.748a
.685
3.053

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.186
.408
.081

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.345
Linear-by-Linear
1.743
1
.187
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.34.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.218

Table 7.1: Political coalition category, 2006 and 2011

Value
.140a
.046
.138

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.709
.829
.710

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.752
Linear-by-Linear
.139
1
.709
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.82.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.408

Table 7.2: Political coalition category for 2006

Value
.707a
.449
.686

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.400
.503
.408

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.397
Linear-by-Linear
.705
1
.401
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13.54.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.248

Table 7.3: Political coalition category for 2011

Value

df

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
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Exact Sig. (2sided)

Exact Sig. (1sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
.971a
1
.324
b
Continuity Correction
.307
1
.579
Likelihood Ratio
1.107
1
.293
Fisher’s Exact Test
.428
Linear-by-Linear
.954
1
.329
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.14.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

.305

Table 8.1: Political Arab category, 2006 and 2011

Value
2.611a
1.842
3.160

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.106
.175
.075

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.126
Linear-by-Linear
2.604
1
.107
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.12.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.080

Table 8.2: Political Arab category for 2006

Value
5.221a
3.959
9.001

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.022
.047
.003

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.017
Linear-by-Linear
5.205
1
.023
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.87.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.011

Table 8.3: Political Arab category for 2011

Value
.489a
.029
.454

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.484
.865
.501

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.602
Linear-by-Linear
.480
1
.488
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.34.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.406

Table 9: Donald Rumsfeld’s exiting as defense secretary in 2006

Value
1.035a
.435
.933

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.309
.510
.334

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.295
Linear-by-Linear
1.032
1
.310
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.58.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.244

Table 10.1: Military activity frame, 2006 and 2011

Value
.098a
.007
.100

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.754
.933
.752

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.098
1
.755
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.68.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.481

Table 10.2: Military activity frame for 2006

Value
.780a
.407
.844

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.377
.523
.358

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.470
Linear-by-Linear
.777
1
.378
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.80.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.270

Table 10.3: Military activity frame for 2011

Value
2.571a
.871
2.214

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.109
.351
.137

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.172
Linear-by-Linear
2.525
1
.112
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .80.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.172

Table 11.1: Coalition military troops category, 2006 and 2011

Value
.029a
.000
.029

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.865
.995
.866

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.871
Linear-by-Linear
.029
1
.866
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.48.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.490

Table 11.2: Coalition military troops category for 2006

Value
.033a
.000
.033

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.856
1.000
.856

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.033
1
.857
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.46.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.518

Table 11.3: Coalition military troops category for 2011

Value
.055a
.000
.054

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.815
1.000
.816

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.054
1
.817
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.63.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.526

Table 12.1: Iraqi police/military category, 2006 and 2011

Value
.923a
.428
1.046

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.337
.513
.306

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.540
Linear-by-Linear
.921
1
.337
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.56.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.268

Table 12.2: Iraqi police/military category for 2006

Value
1.530a
.796
1.894

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.216
.372
.169

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.313
Linear-by-Linear
1.525
1
.217
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.79.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.190

Table 12.3: Iraqi police/military category for 2011

Value
.069a
.000
.066

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.792
1.000
.797

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.068
1
.794
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .80.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.615

Table 13.1: Iraqi civilians category, 2006 and 2011

Value
5.444a
4.742
6.056

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.020
.029
.014

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.019
Linear-by-Linear
5.430
1
.020
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 16.49.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.012

Table 13.2: Iraqi civilians category for 2006

Value
5.838a
5.054
6.603

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.016
.025
.010

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.018
Linear-by-Linear
5.820
1
.016
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.19.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.009

Table 13.3: Iraqi civilians category for 2011

Value
.015a
.000
.015

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.902
1.000
.901

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.015
1
.903
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.14.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.637

Table 14.1: Iraqi prisoners/prisons category , 2006 and 2011

Value
.006a
.000
.006

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.938
1.000
.937

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.006
1
.938
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.12.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.619

Table 14.2: Iraqi prisoners/prisons category for 2006

Value
.592a
.128
.684

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.442
.721
.408

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.690
Linear-by-Linear
.590
1
.442
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.93.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.389

Table 14.3: Iraqi prisoners/prisons category for 2011

Value
.489a
.029
.454

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.484
.865
.501

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.602
Linear-by-Linear
.480
1
.488
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.34.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.406

Table 15.1: Rebuilding of Iraq frame, 2006 and 2011

Value
.892a
.009
.739

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.345
.926
.390

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.396
Linear-by-Linear
.890
1
.346
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .45.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.396

Table 15.2: Rebuilding of Iraq frame for 2006

Value
3.664a
.483
3.086

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.056
.487
.079

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.215
Linear-by-Linear
3.652
1
.056
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.215

Table 15.3: Rebuilding of Iraq frame for 2011

Value
.373a
.000
.630

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.542
1.000
.427

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.366
1
.545
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.732

Table 16.1: Violence/destruction of war frame, 2006 and 2011

Value
.003a
.000
.003

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.954
1.000
.954

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.003
1
.954
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.13.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.578

Table 16.2: Violence/destruction of war frame for 2006

Value
.093a
.006
.095

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.760
.940
.758

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.093
1
.761
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.66.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.484

Table 16.3: Violence/destruction of war frame for 2011

Value
2.783a
.280
2.685

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.095
.597
.101

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.268
Linear-by-Linear
2.733
1
.098
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.268

Table 17.1: Human cost of war for Coalition soldiers frame, 2006 and 2011

Value
33.553a
30.091
26.574

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.000
.000
.000

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.000
Linear-by-Linear
33.464
1
.000
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.56.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.000

Table 17.2: Human cost of war for Coalition soldiers frame for 2006

Value
35.631a
32.002
27.825

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.000
.000
.000

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.000
Linear-by-Linear
35.520
1
.000
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.44.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.000

Table 18.1: Human cost of war for Iraqi casualties frame, 2006 and 2011

Value
2.031a
1.488
2.261

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.154
.223
.133

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.216
Linear-by-Linear
2.026
1
.155
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.47.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.108

Table 18.2: Human cost of war for Iraqi casualties frame, 2006 and 2011

Value
2.359a
1.737
2.680

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.125
.188
.102

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.189
Linear-by-Linear
2.352
1
.125
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.52.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.089

Table 18.3: Human cost of war for Iraqi casualties frame, 2006 and 2011

Value
.069a
.000
.066

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.792
1.000
.797

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.068
1
.794
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .80.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.615

Table 19.1: Wounded/disabled Coalition soldiers frame, 2006 and 2011

Value
.373a
.000
.630

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.542
1.000
.427

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.366
1
.545
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.732

Table 19.2: Wounded/disabled Coalition soldiers frame for 2006

Value
.442a
.075
.409

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.506
.784
.523

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.453
Linear-by-Linear
.441
1
.507
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.15.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.367

Table 19.3: Wounded/disabled Coalition soldiers frame for 2011

Value
.373a
.000
.630

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.542
1.000
.427

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.366
1
.545
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.732

Table 20.1: Wounded/disabled Iraqis frame, 2006 and 2011

Value
.430a
.026
.391

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.512
.872
.532

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.619
Linear-by-Linear
.429
1
.513
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.34.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.401

Table 20.2: Wounded/disabled Iraqis frame for 2006

Value
.508a
.045
.457

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.476
.833
.499

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.613
Linear-by-Linear
.506
1
.477
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.29.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.382

Table 21.1: Anti-war protest frame from Arab countries, 2006 and 2011

Value
.287a
.000
.505

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.592
1.000
.477

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Exact Sig. (1sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.287
1
.592
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

.777

Table 21.2: Anti-war protest frame from Arab countries for 2006

Value
.212a
.000
.198

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.645
1.000
.656

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Exact Sig. (1sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.646
Linear-by-Linear
.212
1
.645
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.50.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

.465

Table 22.1: Anti-war protest frame from Coalition countries, 2006 and 2011

Value
.287a
.000
.505

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.592
1.000
.477

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.287
1
.592
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.777

Table 22.2: Anti-war protest frame from Coalition countries for 2006

Value
.275a
.000
.485

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.600
1.000
.486

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.274
1
.601
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.785

Table 23.1: Celebrating an event associated with the war frame from Coalition countries, 2006 and 2011

Value
6.936a
4.576
5.493

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.008
.032
.019

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.024
Linear-by-Linear
6.918
1
.009
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.34.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.024

Table 23.2: Celebrating an event associated with the war frame from Coalition countries for 2006

Value
3.662a
1.458
2.849

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.056
.227
.091

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.118
Linear-by-Linear
3.650
1
.056
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .64.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

114	
  

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.118

Table 23.3: Celebrating an event associated with the war frame from Coalition countries for 2011

Value
2.571a
.871
2.214

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.109
.351
.137

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.172
Linear-by-Linear
2.525
1
.112
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .80.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.172

	
  
	
  
Table 24.1: Celebrating an event associated with the war frame from Arab countries , 2006 and 2011

Value
.017a
.000
.017

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.895
1.000
.897

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.017
1
.896
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .89.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.637

Table 24.2: Celebrating an event associated with the war frame from Arab countries for 2006

Value
.251a
.000
.226

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.616
1.000
.635

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.517
Linear-by-Linear
.251
1
.617
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .64.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.517

Table 24.3: Celebrating an event associated with the war frame from Arab countries for 2011

Value
.373a
.000
.630

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.542
1.000
.427

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.366
1
.545
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.732

Table 25.1: Human interest stories for Iraqi civilians frame, 2006 and 2011

Value
5.736a
4.461
9.864

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.017
.035
.002

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.010
Linear-by-Linear
5.721
1
.017
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.23.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.007

Table 25.2: Human interest stories for Iraqi civilians frame for 2006

Value
4.308a
3.076
7.459

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.038
.079
.006

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.048
Linear-by-Linear
4.295
1
.038
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.22.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

116	
  

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.024

Table 25.3: Human interest stories for Iraqi civilians frame for 2011

Value
1.576a
.448
2.605

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.209
.503
.107

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.565
Linear-by-Linear
1.548
1
.213
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.07.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.276

Table 26.1: Human interest stories for Iraqi military frame, 2006 and 2011

Value
.287a
.000
.505

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.592
1.000
.477

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.287
1
.592
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.777

Table 26.2: Human interest stories for Iraqi military frame for 2006

Value
.275a
.000
.485

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.600
1.000
.486

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.274
1
.601
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.785

Table 27.1: Human interest stories for Coalition military frame, 2006 and 2011

Value
.016a
.000
.016

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.899
1.000
.900

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.016
1
.899
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.79.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.548

Table 27.2: Human interest stories for Coalition military frame for 2006

Value
1.039a
.417
1.248

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.308
.518
.264

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.468
Linear-by-Linear
1.035
1
.309
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.36.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.275

Table 27.3: Human interest stories for Coalition military frame for 2011

Value
1.847a
.759
1.659

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.174
.384
.198

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.326
Linear-by-Linear
1.814
1
.178
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.61.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.188

Table 28.1: Human interest stories for Coalition civilians frame, 2006 and 2011

Value
.053a
.000
.052

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.818
1.000
.820

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.734
Linear-by-Linear
.053
1
.818
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.67.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.523

Table 28.2: Human interest stories for Coalition civilians frame for 2006

Value
.091a
.000
.088

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.763
1.000
.767

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.725
Linear-by-Linear
.090
1
.764
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.58.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.496

Table 29.1: Societal chaos of war frame, 2006 and 2011

Value
5.005a
4.180
5.943

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.025
.041
.015

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.032
Linear-by-Linear
4.992
1
.025
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.80.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

119	
  

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.015

Table 29.2: Societal chaos of war frame for 2006

Value
4.104a
3.328
4.801

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.043
.068
.028

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Exact Sig. (1sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.045
Linear-by-Linear
4.091
1
.043
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.03.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

.028

Table 29.3: Societal chaos of war frame for 2011

Value
.759a
.003
1.274

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.384
.954
.259

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Exact Sig. (1sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.745
1
.388
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .54.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

.532

Table 30.1: Atrocities of war committed by Coalition military frame, 2006 and 2011

Value
3.514a
2.270
2.984

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.061
.132
.084

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.073
Linear-by-Linear
3.504
1
.061
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.45.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.073

Table 30.2: Atrocities of war committed by Coalition military frame for 2006

Value
.508a
.045
.457

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.476
.833
.499

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Exact Sig. (1sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.613
Linear-by-Linear
.506
1
.477
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.29.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

.382

Table 30.3: Atrocities of war committed by Coalition military frame for 2011

Value
3.088a
1.509
2.704

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.079
.219
.100

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Exact Sig. (1sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.113
Linear-by-Linear
3.033
1
.082
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.34.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

.113

Table 31.1: Atrocities of war committed by Saddam’s regime frame, 2006 and 2011

Value
.287a
.000
.505

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.592
1.000
.477

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.287
1
.592
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.777

Table 31.2: Atrocities of war committed by Saddam’s regime frame for 2006

Value
.275a
.000
.485

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.600
1.000
.486

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Exact Sig. (1sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.274
1
.601
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

.785

Table 32.1: Atrocities of war committed by the Iraqi regime frame, 2006 and 2011

Value
.576a
.000
1.011

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.448
1.000
.315

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.575
1
.448
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .45.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.604

Table 32.2: Atrocities of war committed by the Iraqi regime frame for 2006

Value
.275a
.000
.485

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.600
1.000
.486

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.274
1
.601
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.785

Table 32.3: Atrocities of war committed by the Iraqi regime frame for 2011

Value
.373a
.000
.630

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.542
1.000
.427

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.366
1
.545
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.732

Table 33: Iraq Study group frame for 2006

Value
.808a
.258
.954

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.369
.611
.329

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.696
Linear-by-Linear
.806
1
.369
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.15.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.328

Table 34: Coalition troop withdrawal frame for 2011

Value
.273a
.030
.282

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.601
.862
.595

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.736
Linear-by-Linear
.268
1
.604
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.75.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.442

Table 35.1: Other frame, 2006 and 2011

Value
1.392a
.685
1.708

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.238
.408
.191

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.478
Linear-by-Linear
1.389
1
.239
Association
N of Valid Cases
377
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.67.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.211

Table 35.2: Other frame for 2006

Value
1.039a
.417
1.248

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.308
.518
.264

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
.468
Linear-by-Linear
1.035
1
.309
Association
N of Valid Cases
321
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.36.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.275

Table 35.3: Other frame for 2011

Value
.373a
.000
.630

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.542
1.000
.427

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher’s Exact Test
1.000
Linear-by-Linear
.366
1
.545
Association
N of Valid Cases
56
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Exact Sig. (1sided)

.732
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